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∗ 
ABSTRACT 
This Article offers a coherent way of thinking about double jeopardy 
rules among sovereigns. Its theory has strong explanatory power for 
current double jeopardy law and practice in both U.S. federal and 
international legal systems, recommends adjustments to double jeopardy 
doctrine in both systems, and sharpens normative assessment of that 
doctrine.  
The Article develops a jurisdictional theory of double jeopardy under 
which sovereignty signifies independent jurisdiction to make and apply 
law. Using this theory, the Article recasts the history of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s “dual sovereignty” doctrine entirely in terms of jurisdiction, 
penetrating the opacity of the term “sovereign” as it is often deployed by 
the Court and supplying a useful analytical predictor for future extension 
of the doctrine. The Article then applies the theory to the international 
legal system to explain the confused and seemingly dissonant body of 
modern international law and practice on double jeopardy, including the 
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international law of human rights and extradition, international criminal 
tribunal statutes, and the exercise of universal jurisdiction.  
The Article next explores the theory’s implications for U.S and 
international law in light of two main double jeopardy concerns: the 
individual right to be free from multiple prosecutions, and the sovereign 
ability to enforce law. It argues that since the U.S. dual sovereignty 
doctrine originally derived and continues to derive justification from the 
sovereign’s jurisdiction over the defendant, the Court’s present analysis is 
incomplete and betrays the doctrine’s own foundations by ignoring a 
basic, and necessary, constitutional inquiry: whether a successively 
prosecuting sovereign’s exercise of jurisdiction satisfies due process. This 
inquiry would enrich present doctrine by incorporating individual rights 
concerns—concerns that are now completely absent from dual sovereignty 
analysis—and holds the potential to alter outcomes, especially in cases of 
successive prosecutions between U.S. states and by the federal government 
when it exercises jurisdiction extraterritorially. The theory similarly 
enriches international doctrine through a reasonableness evaluation of a 
successively prosecuting nation-state’s jurisdiction that resembles U.S. 
due process tests. Finally, the Article suggests that where multiple 
sovereigns legitimately may exercise jurisdiction, it does not mean that 
they will; institutionalized comity mechanisms between enforcement 
authorities of different sovereigns can accommodate both the sovereign 
interest to enforce law and the individual interest to be free from multiple 
prosecutions by encouraging the representation of multiple sovereigns’ 
interests in a single prosecution in a single forum.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Why can the U.S. federal government prosecute someone for a bank 
robbery when that person already has been prosecuted for the same bank 
robbery by the state of Illinois,1 and vice versa?2 Similarly, why can 
Alabama prosecute for a homicide that is already the subject of a final 
criminal judgment in Georgia?3  
Now transpose these questions to the international arena where the 
political stakes may be far higher and the legal implications even more 
complex and controversial. If a U.S. national is alleged to have committed 
a crime in Egypt for which he is prosecuted in Egyptian courts, does 
international law have anything to say about whether the United States can 
prosecute him again for the same crime? What if the United States 
prosecutes first and it is Egypt that seeks a second prosecution? Suppose 
the crime alleged is torture, or a war crime. Would a prior conviction or 
acquittal in U.S. courts block a prosecution by Spain or Germany under a 
universal jurisdiction law over such crimes? Could a prosecution by one of 
these states block the United States from prosecuting its own national? 
What if instead the case were referred to an international tribunal, like the 
International Criminal Court? When would a prosecution in national court 
bar an international tribunal prosecution, and when would an international 
tribunal prosecution bar a prosecution in national court?  
The language of double jeopardy permeates U.S. and international law. 
Yet we still don’t have clear answers to why or when different 
“sovereigns” may prosecute for the same crime. These questions highlight 
a central tension between the very idea of sovereignty and the 
longstanding, widely held legal intuition that an individual should not be 
subject to multiple prosecutions for the same offense. The questions also 
implicate the basic power structure of legal systems like the U.S. federal 
and international system which purport to be comprised of distinct 
sovereigns—the several states of the United States and the world’s nation-
states, respectively.  
How to, and how best to, answer these double jeopardy questions 
present legal and policy challenges that are only going to gain in frequency 
and importance in an increasingly globalized world with an increasing 
potential for jurisdictional overlap among sovereigns. Conventional 
 
 
 1. See, e.g., Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 
(1922). 
 2. See, e.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).  
 3. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985).  
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accounts of how double jeopardy rules work in systems of multiple 
sovereigns not only fail descriptively to capture the complexity of existing 
law, but also fall flat as normative depictions of the high-stakes struggle of 
interests the rules necessarily imply. Now more than ever, lawyers and 
policy makers need a sophisticated way of thinking about, and resolving, 
the competing claims of sovereigns to enforce their laws; of defendants 
not to be prosecuted multiple times for the same crime; of victims to see 
justice done; and, not least, of the systems of sovereigns themselves to 
avoid destabilization through prosecutorial overreaching by some 
members to the affront and provocation of others.  
In the U.S. context, the Supreme Court’s facile resort to the doctrine of 
dual sovereignty functions mainly as an analysis-stopper. By labeling 
successively prosecuting entities separate sovereigns, the Court permits 
multiple prosecutions and ends all further discussion under the 
Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause.4 Yet how to determine what 
constitutes a “sovereign” within the meaning of the doctrine is far from 
clear. And while the doctrine has invited its fair share of criticism (indeed, 
it is hard to find any commentary that is not critical),5 there has been little 
focused effort to peel back the label of “sovereign” and cleanly articulate 
what underlies its meaning in this jurisprudence.6 We are left instead with 
a famously opaque doctrine7 and a dearth of analytical tools for predicting 
its future extension.  
 
 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 5. See Ronald J. Allen & John P. Ratnaswamy, Heath v. Alabama: A Case Study of Doctrine 
and Rationality in the Supreme Court, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 801, 818 (1985); Akhil Reed 
Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney King, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4–28 
(1995); Daniel A. Braun, Praying to False Sovereigns: The Rule Permitting Successive Prosecutions 
in the Age of Cooperative Federalism, 20 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (1992); Kenneth M. Murchison, The Dual 
Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 383 (1986); George C. 
Thomas III, Islands in the Stream of History: An Institutional Archeology of Dual Sovereignty, 1 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 345 (2003); see also Walter T. Fisher, Double Jeopardy, Two Sovereigns, and the 
Intruding Constitution, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1961); Thomas Franck, An International Lawyer 
Looks at the Bartkus Rule, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1096 (1959); J. A. C. Grant, Successive Prosecutions by 
State and Nation: Common Law and British Empire Comparisons, 4 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1956) 
[hereinafter Grant, Successive Prosecutions]; J. A. C. Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive 
Prosecutions, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1309 (1932) [hereinafter Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive 
Prosecutions]; Lawrence Newman, Double Jeopardy and the Problem of Successive Prosecutions: A 
Suggested Solution, 34 S. CAL. L. REV. 252 (1961); George C. Pontikes, Dual Sovereignty and Double 
Jeopardy: A Critique of Bartkus v. Illinois and Abbate v. United States, 14 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 700 
(1963).  
 6. See e.g., Allen & Ratnaswamy, supra note 5, at 817–19. 
 7. Much criticism leveled at the doctrine is that it is unprincipled, see generally id., or simply 
the accident of peculiar historical moments. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 5, at 345; Murchison, supra 
note 5, at 383.  
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The international legal context is even more perplexing. International 
instruments and state practice seem to point in so many directions at once 
that the international law of double jeopardy looks to be nothing more than 
a jumbled mess of partial and often inconsistent rules implying a general 
doctrinal incoherence. Human rights and humanitarian law instruments 
guarantee a right against double jeopardy, but only from successive 
prosecutions by a single state.8 Extradition treaties guarantee protection 
from successive prosecutions between states, but only in certain 
circumstances.9 State practice is literally all over the map, with some states 
providing near absolute double jeopardy protection based on a foreign 
prosecution, and others none at all.10 At the same time, a clear and uniform 
international trend appears to be taking hold that would preclude 
prosecutions based on universal jurisdiction if the defendant has been (or 
in many cases will be) prosecuted by a state where the crime took place or 
whose nationals were directly involved.11 Added to the mix are the statutes 
of international criminal tribunals, which protect against successive 
prosecutions as between states and tribunals in some cases but not in 
others.12 Perhaps because of this doctrinal disarray, commentary has 
tended to concentrate on discrete double jeopardy issues,13 with no work 
tackling head-on the larger question of whether this apparently discordant 
body of law and practice might be explicable through a unifying, 
explanatory theory.14  
This Article sets out to develop such a theory. The Article then uses the 
theory to explain, critique, and offer improvements to double jeopardy 
rules among sovereigns in the U.S. and international legal systems. To be 
clear from the start, I do not intend to suggest that these two systems are 
identical; they aren’t. Or that double jeopardy rules work exactly the same 
way in U.S. and international law; they don’t. But I do want to use the 
heuristic and analogical value of each system for the other to come up with 
 
 
 8. See infra Part IV.A.  
 9. See infra Part IV.B. 
 10. See infra Part IV.C. 
 11. See infra Part IV.D.  
 12. See infra Part IV.E.  
 13. See, e.g., Michele N. Morosin, Double Jeopardy and International Law: Obstacles to 
Formulating a General Principle, 64 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 261 (1995) (discussing application of the 
double jeopardy principle to the Draft Statute of the ICC, Draft Code of Crimes and the ICTY Statute); 
Christine Van den Wyngaert & Guy Stessens, The International Non bis in Idem Principle: Resolving 
Some of the Unanswered Questions, 48 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 779 (1999). 
 14. One author proposes a “core” double jeopardy rule either as a future customary rule or 
general principle, but does not resolve tensions in present international law and practice. See Gerard 
Conway, Ne bis in Idem in International Law, 3 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 217 (2003). 
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an innovative and persuasive theory that explains double jeopardy rules in 
both. I then evaluate those rules and, ultimately, show how they can be 
improved by the present theory.  
My basic premise will be that “sovereignty” for double jeopardy 
purposes really means the legal concept of jurisdiction—and, more 
specifically, independent jurisdiction to prescribe, or to make and apply, 
law. This prescriptive jurisdiction in turn authorizes independent 
jurisdiction to enforce that law through a separate prosecution.  
Part I combines the Supreme Court’s dual sovereignty language with 
international concepts of jurisdiction to articulate this basic premise. Part 
II then recasts the history of dual sovereignty in the U.S. federal context 
using the concepts introduced in Part I. It explains that the doctrine 
originated out of concurrent federal and state jurisdiction in the U.S. 
federal system, and that throughout its evolution the Court has consistently 
justified the doctrine’s application in terms of jurisdiction—and, more 
specifically, in terms of independent jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce 
law. The theory therefore both opens up analysis of how and why the 
Court has employed the dual sovereignty doctrine in the past and provides 
a helpful predictor of how the Court will extend it in the future.  
Parts III and IV apply the jurisdictional theory to the international legal 
system. Using the theory, Part III derives a few baseline rules of 
international double jeopardy. It argues that: (1) a state with an 
independent basis of national jurisdiction deriving mainly from 
entitlements over national territory and persons is an independent 
lawgiver, or “sovereign,” for double jeopardy purposes that retains the 
ability to apply and enforce its own laws through prosecution in the face of 
prior prosecutions by other states; and (2) the state may do so whether the 
crime is a national offense (like homicide) or is also an international 
offense (like genocide); but (3) where a state’s jurisdiction derives solely 
from a shared entitlement with all other states to apply and enforce the 
international law against universal crimes, it should be blocked from 
prosecuting again if another state already has prosecuted for the crime in 
question. Part III concludes by showing that these same rules of 
international double jeopardy were enunciated in a U.S. Supreme Court 
opinion from 1820, the same year the Court began to develop the 
jurisdictional reasoning that underpins the dual sovereignty doctrine in the 
U.S. federal system today.  
Part IV demonstrates that these rules continue to explain modern 
international law and practice. They explain, for example, why human 
rights and humanitarian law instruments limit their double jeopardy 
coverage to successive prosecutions by one state, why extradition treaties 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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so narrowly and self-consciously construe an exception to the default rule 
permitting double jeopardy among states, why no general principle of law 
has developed to prevent double jeopardy among states, and why the one 
situation in which states overwhelmingly if not uniformly refrain from 
pursuing successive prosecutions is where their only basis of jurisdiction 
is the universal nature of the crime under international law. Part IV also 
uses a jurisdictional analysis to explain double jeopardy protections in 
international tribunal statutes. Taking as its primary examples the 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals (ICTY and ICTR, respectively) and the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), it describes how the double jeopardy 
protections in the different tribunal statutes are integrally tied to their 
jurisdictional provisions, and how these provisions largely create a shared 
jurisdiction—through either primacy or complementary jurisdiction—
between tribunals and national courts, such that when one exercises 
jurisdiction it extinguishes the jurisdiction of the other, leading to double 
jeopardy protection between them. Where tribunal statutes do allow for 
successive prosecutions, it is because the double jeopardy provision in 
question has reserved a portion of jurisdiction to either the state or the 
tribunal, upon which that entity successively may prosecute.  
Next, the theory not only advances current double jeopardy 
conversation by making sense of a confused doctrine in highly charged 
areas, it also facilitates clarity in assessing that doctrine and recommends 
adjustments to it. Part V accordingly shifts focus to engage some of the 
theory’s more important implications for U.S. and international law as 
measured against an axial tension in double jeopardy rules among 
sovereigns: the tension between the individual’s right to be free from 
multiple prosecutions and the sovereign’s power to enforce law over 
activity harmful to its interests. Part V argues that a jurisdictional theory 
improves conventional analysis in both U.S. and international law to better 
accommodate this tension. Specifically, the theory brings into an 
otherwise simplistically one-dimensional sovereignty doctrine not only the 
interests of other sovereigns and the larger systems they comprise, but 
also, importantly, the interests of individual defendants.  
First, since under the theory a prosecuting entity’s “sovereignty” within 
the U.S. dual sovereignty doctrine derives from the entity’s jurisdiction 
over the defendant, it follows that the exercise of that jurisdiction by either 
federal or state government must satisfy due process under the Fifth or 
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.15 The Supreme Court’s 
 
 
 15. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.  
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obtuse dual sovereignty analysis presently ignores this basic constitutional 
inquiry—a decidedly nuanced, fact-sensitive evaluation geared toward 
ensuring that a sovereign’s exercise of jurisdiction is not “arbitrary or 
fundamentally unfair.”16 The result is an incomplete doctrine divorced 
from its own intellectual and constitutional roots, and one that completely 
ignores individual rights. I explain that while a due process evaluation of a 
successively prosecuting sovereign’s jurisdiction likely would not impact 
dual sovereignty rulings regarding successive federal/state prosecutions—
the original justification for the dual sovereignty doctrine—it does hold 
potential to change outcomes regarding successive prosecutions between 
U.S. states or by the federal government when it exercises extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. And it does so in ways that directly include fairness concerns 
otherwise wholly omitted by present analysis to the exclusion of 
individual rights.  
Second, international law contains a reasonableness limitation on 
nation-states’ exercise of jurisdiction that bears strong resemblances to 
U.S. due process constraints, and that incorporates many of the same 
considerations.17 Conceptualizing sovereignty as jurisdiction under this 
limitation demonstrates the normative appeal of the baseline international 
double jeopardy rules articulated in Part III and, in particular, of the rule 
precluding successive prosecutions based solely on universal jurisdiction. 
A central purpose of universal jurisdiction is to vindicate the rights of 
victims and the international legal system as a whole through the 
enforcement of international law where states with close ties to the crimes 
are either unwilling or unable to prosecute. Human rights interests thus 
weigh on both sides of the double jeopardy question: on one side is the 
right of the defendant not to be prosecuted again and again for the same 
crime, but on the other are the rights of victims to see justice done. The 
double jeopardy rules I develop for the international system balance 
effectively the interests of sovereigns, defendants, victims, and the system 
as a whole.  
Lastly, I explore how best to reduce successive prosecutions by those 
states that may successively prosecute so as to protect individuals from 
multiple prosecutions while still allowing states to act against those who 
cause direct harm to national interests. I suggest that one way to 
accomplish this goal is through comity mechanisms that promote 
communication and coordination among different sovereigns’ enforcement 
 
 
 16. See infra notes 367–73 and accompanying text.  
 17. See infra notes 407–13 and accompanying text.  
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authorities from the outset of investigatory or prosecutorial efforts. These 
mechanisms enable states with direct interests in prosecution to represent 
those interests from the start of a given enforcement action, increasing the 
likelihood that a single enforcement action in a single forum will vindicate 
interests of all states with legitimate claims to prosecute. The comity 
mechanisms tend also to create efficiencies and ease friction for the 
system at large by encouraging states to internalize ex ante the effects of 
their own enforcement actions on other jurisdictionally interested states. 
The result is a reduced need for, and probability of, multiple prosecutions 
for the same crime.  
I. DECONSTRUCTING “SOVEREIGNTY” 
A. Double Jeopardy and the Problem of Sovereignty 
The idea that an individual cannot be prosecuted multiple times for the 
same offense has a long and storied pedigree18 reaching back to ancient 
Greece and Rome.19 It was adopted early on in Church canon law,20 
perpetuated through the Dark Ages,21 and gained the status of “universal 
maxim of the common law” in England.22 At early common law, the plea 
at bar took two forms, auterfois acquit de même felonie—already acquitted 
of the same offense,23 and auterfois convict de même felonie—already 
convicted of the same offense.24 The term double jeopardy itself comes 
from the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment guarantee: “nor shall any 
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life 
or limb.”25 Civil law systems26 and international legal instruments27 often 
refer to the principle by its Latin name, non bis in idem or ne bis in idem—
 
 
 18. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151–55 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).  
 19. Id. at 151–52 & n.3 (citing sources).  
 20. Id. at 152 & n.4 (citing sources). 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. at 153 & n.6; WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *335.  
 23. Id. at *335–36; 2 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 240–55 
(Professional Books Ltd. 1987) (1736). 
 24. Id.  
 25. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
 26. See, e.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 7, 1987, 75 
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfGE] 1 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.utexas. 
edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/german/case.php?id=570; see discussion infra 
notes 233–35 and accompanying text. 
 27. See, e.g., A.P. v. Italy, Communication No. 204/1986, Report of the Human Rights Comm., 
43d Sess., supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc. A/43/40 (1988) (interpreting the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights); see also discussion infra notes 204–09 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss4/1
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“not twice for the same thing,”28 deriving from the Roman maxim nemo 
bis vexari pro una et eadam causa, “a man shall not be twice vexed or 
tried for the same cause.”29 “Nobody disputes the justice or the obligation 
of the rule of former jeopardy in the abstract,”30 Charles Batchelder 
famously observed, “the difficulty is in deciding where it shall be 
applied.”31  
A fundamental question for any double jeopardy protection is whether 
different sovereigns successively may prosecute for the same criminal 
activity. The U.S. Supreme Court has resolved the issue in the context of 
U.S. federalism by developing the dual sovereignty doctrine. The doctrine 
“is founded on the . . . conception of crime as an offense against the 
sovereignty of the government.”32 It holds that “[w]hen a defendant in a 
single act violates the (peace and dignity) of two sovereigns by breaking 
the laws of each, he has committed two distinct ‘offences.’”33 No violation 
of the prohibition on double jeopardy results from successive prosecutions 
by different sovereigns, according to the Court, because “by one act [the 
defendant] has committed two offences, for each of which he is justly 
punishable.”34 The defendant, in other words, is not being prosecuted 
twice for the same “offence”35 if another sovereign successively 
prosecutes for the same act—even if the second sovereign prosecutes 
using a law identical to that used in the first prosecution.36  
By permitting multiple sovereigns to pursue multiple prosecutions for 
the same criminal activity, the dual sovereignty doctrine immediately 
raises the follow-up question: how do we tell whether a successive 
prosecution is truly by another sovereign? Simply invoking the label 
“sovereign” is not very helpful; standing alone the word reduces to a 
tautology. It cannot tell us on its own whether a given entity—be it a 
nation-state, a sub-national state, a territory, or a municipality—is truly a 
sovereign.37 Rather, “sovereign” signifies the result or description of some 
allocation of power, not the reason for that allocation of power.38  
 
 
 28. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1077 (8th ed. 2004). 
 29. Conway, supra note 14, at 217 & n.1.  
 30. Charles E. Batchelder, Former Jeopardy, 17 AM. L. REV. 735, 749 (1883).  
 31. Id.  
 32. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985). 
 33. Id. (citing United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922)). 
 34. Id. (quoting Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 20 (1852)). 
 35. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 36. See Heath, 474 U.S. at 87–88. 
 37. Louis Henkin, That “S” Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, et cetera, 
68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1999).  
 38. Allen & Ratnaswamy, supra note 5, at 818.  
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The Supreme Court has tried to pour some content into the word for 
purposes of the dual sovereignty doctrine. The key to ascertaining dual 
sovereigns, according to the Court, “turns on whether the two 
[prosecuting] entities draw their authority to punish the offender from 
distinct sources of power.”39 Thus “the sovereignty of two prosecuting 
entities for [double jeopardy] purposes is determined by the ultimate 
source of the power under which the respective prosecutions were 
undertaken.”40 If there are two “ultimate sources of power,” there are two 
sovereigns, and consequently there can be two prosecutions without 
violating the prohibition on double jeopardy.41  
But what does “ultimate source of power” mean? The Court doesn’t 
quite explain. It does however tell us what the features of such power are: 
“Each government in determining what shall be an offense against its 
peace and dignity is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the 
other.”42 Or to rephrase it with a bit more detail, “each has the power, 
inherent in any sovereign, independently to determine what shall be an 
offense against its authority and to punish such offenses, and in doing so 
each is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other.”43 Thus an 
entity is “sovereign” when it has the power—independently—(1) to 
determine what shall be an offense, and (2) to punish such offenses.44 And 
when it exercises these powers, it exercises its own sovereignty, not that of 
other sovereigns.45 Multiple prosecutions attend multiple sovereigns 
because “[f]oremost among the prerogatives of sovereignty is the power to 
create and enforce a criminal code.”46  
In what follows I argue that the power to determine and enforce law is 
really the legal concept of jurisdiction, and that “ultimate source of power” 
is really an autonomous lawgiver with independent jurisdiction to 
prescribe and enforce law—the hallmarks of “sovereignty” within the 
meaning of the dual sovereignty doctrine.  
 
 
 39. Heath, 474 U.S. at 88. 
 40. Id. at 90 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320 (1978)) (internal quotations 
omitted).  
 41. Id.  
 42. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).  
 43. Heath, 474 U.S. at 89–90 (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 320) (internal quotations omitted). 
 44. Id. at 89. 
 45. Id. at 89–90. 
 46. Id. at 93. 
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B. Sovereignty Means Jurisdiction  
Jurisdiction both functionally and conceptually informs the notion of 
sovereignty. Functionally, it is a legal term for power.47 If a court or 
legislature has no jurisdiction over you, it has no power over you. Here is 
where international law helps out the analysis. International law regularly 
divides jurisdiction into three types: jurisdiction to prescribe, jurisdiction 
to adjudicate, and jurisdiction to enforce.48 Jurisdiction to prescribe, or 
prescriptive jurisdiction, is the power to make and apply law to persons or 
things.49 Generally speaking, this power is typically, though not always, 
exercised by a legislative body,50 such as the Congress in the United States 
(or a state legislature in one of the several U.S. states). Jurisdiction to 
adjudicate, or adjudicative jurisdiction, is the power to subject an 
individual to adjudicative process.51 This power is typically, though again 
not always, exercised by the judiciary.52 And jurisdiction to enforce, or 
enforcement jurisdiction, is self-evidently the power to enforce law, which 
is often carried out through prosecution backed up by police force.53 
Importantly, adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction must rely upon 
some prescriptive jurisdiction.54 Thus if a prosecuting entity has no 
prescriptive jurisdiction over a particular activity, it has no power to 
subject the parties to that activity to judicial process and enforcement.55  
Framed in the Supreme Court’s dual sovereignty language, prescriptive 
jurisdiction represents (1) the power “to determine what shall be an 
offense,”56 and adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction represent (2) the 
power “to punish such offenses.”57 Where an entity has an independent 
prescriptive jurisdiction, it is functionally a “sovereign” as envisaged by 
the dual sovereignty doctrine: it independently may determine what shall 
be an offense, and may marshal its adjudicative and enforcement 
jurisdiction to punish that offense. 
 
 
 47. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 28, at 867. 
 48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401 
(1987).  
 49. Id. § 401(a).  
 50. Id. § 401 & intro. note. 
 51. Id. § 401(b).  
 52. Id. § 401 & intro. note. 
 53. Id. § 401(c) & intro. note. 
 54. Id. § 431 cmt. a. 
 55. Id.  
 56. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 89–90 (1985). 
 57. Id.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
782 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:769 
 
 
 
 
C. Ultimate Source of Power Means Lawgiver 
Conceiving of sovereignty as independent jurisdiction to prescribe law 
is moreover conceptually and etymologically faithful to the term 
jurisdiction, which derives from the Latin jus or juris (law) plus dicere 
(speak).58 At its root, jurisdiction means “the speaking of law.”59 For any 
given community the law-speaker is manifest in the body—and, even 
more specifically, in the mouth—of the sovereign. This was quite literally 
the case in absolute monarchies, where the King or Queen pronounced the 
law.60 It is abstractly captured in theocracies, where God speaks through 
earthly interpreters of religious texts. And it can be generalized to 
democratic rule, where “popular sovereignty” prevails and government 
mobilizes when “the people have spoken.” As the literal or figurative 
mouthpiece of the law, the sovereign is what we might think of as the 
lawgiver for those within its jurisdiction—those for whom it “speaks law.” 
The sovereign’s unique lawgiving voice is what gives rise to its power 
independently to determine offenses and to punish them; in other words, 
what makes it sovereign within the meaning of the dual sovereignty 
doctrine.  
To cast this all in the Supreme Court’s terminology then, “ultimate 
source of power”61 represents the law-speaker or lawgiver; the lawgiver 
has the power “independently to determine what shall be an offense”62—or 
to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction, which authorizes its power “to punish 
such offenses”63—or to exercise adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction. 
II. AS APPLIED TO THE U.S. FEDERAL SYSTEM  
This Part traces the origins and development of the dual sovereignty 
doctrine in the U.S. system and explains the doctrine’s entire history in 
terms of jurisdiction. My purpose is threefold: to look through the term 
“sovereign” to understand what is really motivating the Court’s analysis; 
to lay some analogical groundwork for the international system discussed 
 
 
 58. SHORTER OXFORD DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 1472 (William R. Trumbull & 
Angus J. Stevenson eds., 5th ed. 2002). 
 59. Costas Douzinas, The Metaphysics of Jurisdiction, in JURISPRUDENCE OF JURISDICTION 21, 
22 (Shaun McVeigh ed., 2007).  
 60. JEAN-LUC NANCY, THE BIRTH TO PRESENCE 132 (Brian Holmes et al. trans., Stanford Univ. 
Press 1993).  
 61. Heath, 474 U.S. at 90. 
 62. Id. at 89–90. 
 63. Id. 
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in the next two Parts; and to set the stage for a critique of present U.S. dual 
sovereignty doctrine in Part V.  
The dual sovereignty doctrine took shape in early Supreme Court 
jurisprudence addressed to the question of concurrent jurisdiction between 
federal and state governments. Justice Johnson began setting the doctrine’s 
foundation in his 1820 concurrence in Houston v. Moore.64 Houston 
upheld Pennsylvania’s ability to try a militiaman for failing to report for 
federal service.65 Justice Washington issued the judgment of the Court, 
concluding that the state court martial could enforce federal law.66 For 
Justice Washington, the question presented was whether the state court 
could exercise concurrent adjudicative jurisdiction with federal courts to 
enforce federal law, which he answered affirmatively.67 As David Currie 
has noted, “Washington, however, cannot be said to have spoken for the 
Court in Houston,”68 because of the disagreement on the reasoning for the 
judgment.69 Justice Johnson was clear on this, explaining at the end of his 
concurrence that “there is no point whatever decided, except that the fine 
was constitutionally imposed” by the state court,70 and that “[t]he course 
of reasoning by which the judges have reached this conclusion are [sic] 
various, coinciding in but one thing, viz., that there is no error in the 
judgment [below].”71  
For Johnson, the case had more to do with concurrent prescriptive 
jurisdiction. According to Johnson, Houston’s complaint was “that his 
offence was an offence against the laws of the United States, [and] that he 
is liable to be punished under [federal] laws, and cannot, therefore, be 
constitutionally punished under the laws of his own State.”72 Johnson 
rejected this argument, and asked rhetorically: “Why may not the same 
offence be made punishable both under the laws of the States, and of the 
United States?”73 He answered himself that “[e]very citizen of a State 
owes a double allegiance; he enjoys the protection and participates in the 
 
 
 64. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 25–32. 
 67. Id. 
 68. David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of the Federal Courts, 
1801–1835, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 646, 702 (1982). 
 69. Id. at 705 (explaining that Washington “noted that while all but two Justices agreed that the 
judgment should stand, ‘they do not concur in all respects in the reasons which influence my opinion.’ 
What is peculiar is that except for Johnson, who wrote a long concurrence, we do not know the 
grounds on which the other Justices voted.” (citing Houston, 18 U.S. at 32–47)). 
 70. Houston, 18 U.S. at 47 (Johnson, J., concurring). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 32–33.  
 73. Id. at 33. 
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government of both the State and the United States.”74 Johnson observed 
that the “exercise of this concurrent right of punishing is familiar,”75 
giving the example of robbing the mail on the highway, “which is 
unquestionably cognizable as highway-robbery under the State laws,” but 
also a federal offense under U.S. law.76  
 Johnson then addressed a main counterargument to such concurrent 
federal and state jurisdiction; namely “if the States can at all legislate or 
adjudicate on the subject” of federal regulation, “they may . . . embarrass[] 
the progress of the general government.”77 That is, if state jurisdiction 
overlaps with federal jurisdiction, the states could thwart the federal 
government’s ability to carry out federal lawmaking and enforcement 
functions. One obvious way for the states to do this, of course, would be to 
acquit an individual in state court so as to insulate him from prosecution in 
federal court for the same act. Or, as Johnson put it, “[i]t is true, if we 
could admit that an acquittal in the State Courts could be pleaded in bar to 
a prosecution in the Courts of the United States, the evil might occur.”78 
Yet such a reading of double jeopardy doctrine, in Johnson’s view, would 
be wrong: 
But this is a doctrine [prior acquittal as a bar to double jeopardy] 
which can only be maintained on the ground that an offence against 
the laws of the one government, is an offence against the other 
government; and can surely never be successfully asserted in any 
instances but those in which jurisdiction is vested in the State 
Courts by statutory provisions of the United States. . . . [C]rimes 
against a government are only cognizable in its own Courts, or in 
those which derive their right of holding jurisdiction from the 
offended government.79 
Because the state government and the federal government—as distinct 
lawgivers—enjoy distinct jurisdictions to make and apply distinct laws, 
distinct prosecutions would be permissible.  
Indeed, the only circumstance in which double jeopardy protection 
against a successive federal prosecution could arise, according to Johnson, 
would be where state courts acted on behalf of the federal government in 
 
 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 34. 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. at 35.  
 78. Id. 
 79. Id.  
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applying federal law, i.e., where “jurisdiction is vested in the State Courts 
by statutory provisions of the United States.”80 In this limited 
circumstance, state courts would act as the adjudicative and enforcement 
agents not of state law, but of federal law. They would “derive their right 
of holding jurisdiction”81 not from the state’s lawgiving authority to 
prescribe offenses, but from the federal government’s, and would therefore 
be constrained to apply not state, but federal law.82 A successive federal 
court prosecution in these circumstances would lead to double jeopardy 
problems since the doctrine prohibits successive prosecutions under the 
same law—here, federal law.83   
A few mid-nineteenth century cases entrenched Johnson’s concurrent 
jurisdiction reasoning in Houston and foreshadowed its evolution into the 
dual sovereignty doctrine. In Fox v. Ohio,84 the defendant challenged her 
state conviction for passing counterfeit coin on the grounds that only the 
federal government had jurisdiction over that offense. The Court disposed 
of the challenge by distinguishing counterfeiting, which was an offense 
exclusively within the power of Congress to proscribe, from passing 
counterfeit coin, which was a fraud punishable under state law.85  
The Court then discussed the possibility, raised by the defendant86 and 
by Justice McLean in dissent,87 that because of concurrent federal and 
state jurisdictions a defendant could be prosecuted and punished twice “for 
acts essentially the same.”88 The Court conceded the possibility, but 
hedged that “the benignant spirit in which the institutions both of the State 
and federal systems are administered” would make such double jeopardy 
exceptional as a policy matter.89 The Court was careful to point out, 
however, that if the policy were the other way around—if instead of being 
the exception, double jeopardy by state and federal prosecutions were the 
regular practice—such practice would be entirely permissible. 
Immediately after speculating that successive prosecutions likely would 
 
 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. 
 82. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 130 (1958). 
 83. Washington’s opinion, which viewed the state court in Houston as enforcing federal law, see 
supra note 67, contemplated this type of double jeopardy bar. See Houston, 18 U.S. at 31 (explaining 
that “if the jurisdiction of the two Courts be concurrent, the sentence of either Court, either of 
conviction or acquittal, might be pleaded in bar of the prosecution before the other”). 
 84. 46 U.S. 410, 433 (1847).  
 85. Id. at 433–34. 
 86. Id. at 428.  
 87. Id. at 439–40 (McLean, J., dissenting). 
 88. Id. at 435. 
 89. Id. 
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only “occur in instances of peculiar enormity, or where the public safety 
demanded extraordinary rigor,”90 the Court explained:  
But were a contrary course of policy and action either probable or 
usual, this would by no means justify the conclusion, that offences 
falling within the competency of different authorities to restrain or 
punish them would not properly be subjected to the consequences 
which those authorities might ordain and affix to their 
perpetration.91  
Thus even if successive prosecutions by state and federal governments 
were the norm, it still would not undermine the power of each government 
to prohibit, prosecute, and punish “offences falling within the 
competency,” or jurisdiction, “of [these] different authorities,”92 or 
lawgivers. And because passing counterfeit coin was “clearly within the 
rightful power and jurisdiction of the State [of Ohio],” the case raised no 
constitutional problem.93 Three years later in United States v. Marigold,94 
the Court affirmed Fox’s concurrent jurisdiction holding, explaining that 
the states and Congress each had independent jurisdiction to prosecute and 
punish uttering false currency.95  
Just two years later, Moore v. Illinois96 solidified the jurisdictional 
foundation laid by Houston, Fox, and Marigold. Moore involved a 
challenge to a state court conviction under an Illinois law outlawing 
harboring fugitive slaves.97 Advancing what by now should be a familiar 
pair of arguments, Moore contended that the federal Fugitive Slave Act 
preempted the Illinois statute such that he could not be prosecuted under 
state law and raised the related objection that if the Court ruled the Illinois 
statute valid then he impermissibly could be subject to multiple 
prosecutions for the same offense.98 In response to the first contention, the 
Court found no federal preemption but rather that Illinois had an 
independent jurisdiction to prohibit the activity in question; that is, the 
statute was “but the exercise of the power which every State is admitted to 
possess, of defining offences and punishing offenders against its laws.”99 
 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id.  
 94. 50 U.S. 560 (1850). 
 95. Id. at 569–70.  
 96. 55 U.S. 13 (1852). 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 17. 
 99. Id. at 18. 
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And in response to the double jeopardy concern, the Court announced the 
dual sovereignty doctrine: 
An offence, in its legal signification, means the transgression of a 
law. . . . Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State 
or territory. He may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, 
and may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the laws of 
either. The same act may be an offence or transgression of the laws 
of both. . . . That either or both may (if they see fit) punish such an 
offender, cannot be doubted. Yet it cannot be truly averred that the 
offender has been twice punished for the same offence; but only that 
by one act he has committed two offences, for each of which he is 
justly punishable. He could not plead the punishment by one in bar 
to a conviction by the other.100  
The Supreme Court repeated Moore’s concurrent jurisdiction reasoning 
in a number of opinions101 before finally confronting a true case of 
multiple prosecutions in its 1922 decision United States v. Lanza.102 Given 
 
 
 100. Id. at 19–20. 
 101. See, e.g., United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922). The only relevant opinion during this 
period that arguably did not affirm the dual sovereignty doctrine was Nielson v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315 
(1909). There, a Washington resident appealed his Oregon conviction for purse net fishing on the 
Columbia River, the common boundary between Oregon and Washington. Id. The activity was 
explicitly permitted under Washington law but prohibited under Oregon law. Id. at 321. By legislation 
Congress had granted both states a shared jurisdiction over the river in order “to avoid any nice 
question as to whether a criminal act sought to be prosecuted was committed on one side or the other 
of the exact boundary in the channel.” Id. at 320. The Court ruled that Oregon could not punish that 
which Washington permitted within its own territory (including the river). Id. at 321. In reaching its 
decision the Court noted in dicta that 
where an act is . . . prohibited and punishable by the laws of both States, the one first 
acquiring jurisdiction of the person may prosecute the offense, and its judgment is a finality 
in both States, so that one convicted or acquitted in the courts of the one State cannot be 
prosecuted for the same offense in the courts of the other.  
Id. at 320. Some commentators have seized upon this passage as supporting a double jeopardy bar 
among different sovereigns. See, e.g., Grant, Successive Prosecutions, supra note 5, at 1–2; 
Murchison, supra note 5, at 386. 
 Yet under a theory that equates sovereignty with independent prescriptive jurisdiction, it is 
possible to make sense of the Nielson dicta, especially in light of the Court’s holding. The key is to 
remember that the shared jurisdiction of Washington and Oregon over the river was a product of 
congressional legislation authorizing that shared jurisdiction. Neilson, 212 U.S. at 320. If sovereignty 
is independent jurisdiction to prescribe law, and Oregon and Washington share jurisdiction such that 
neither can prohibit something that the other permits, id. at 319, then neither state really can be said to 
have independent prescriptive jurisdiction over the river, i.e., sovereignty. The reason a conviction or 
acquittal in the courts of one state for an offense punishable by the laws of both would bar successive 
prosecution by the other is that there is only one prescriptive jurisdiction—granted by Congress—that 
both states share over the river, albeit one that each may enforce in its own courts. But this single, 
shared jurisdiction to prescribe a particular offense cannot be enforced multiple times.  
 102. Lanza, 260 U.S. at 377. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 550–51 (1875) 
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this history, the reasoning inspiring Lanza should come as no surprise. 
Upholding a successive federal prosecution under the prohibition-era 
Volstead Act after a state court conviction for the same acts, the Court 
explained: “Each State, as also Congress, may exercise an independent 
judgment in selecting and shaping measures to enforce prohibition. Such 
as are adopted by Congress become laws of the United States and such as 
are adopted by a State become laws of that State.”103 The independent 
judgment to determine and enforce law, the Court elaborated, “is an 
inseparable incident of independent legislative action in distinct 
jurisdictions.”104 Thus in the first true application of the dual sovereignty 
doctrine, the Court explicitly employed the concept of jurisdiction—and, 
more specifically, independent prescriptive jurisdiction to determine 
offenses—to justify its holding.  
The Court would go on to use the dual sovereignty doctrine to uphold 
successive federal court prosecutions following state court convictions for 
the same acts;105 successive state court prosecutions (and convictions) 
following acquittal of the same acts in federal court;106 successive federal 
court prosecutions following conviction for the same acts in Indian Tribal 
Courts;107 and successive prosecutions in different state courts for the 
same act where the defendant pleaded guilty in the first case to avoid the 
death penalty but was sentenced to death in the second.108  
On the other hand, where the Court has been unwilling to find a dual 
sovereignty exception to double jeopardy, it has stressed the absence of an 
independent prescriptive jurisdiction by each prosecuting entity and has 
emphasized that both entities draw their jurisdiction from the same 
lawgiving source. In Grafton v. United States, for example, the Court held 
that a homicide prosecution by military court martial foreclosed a 
successive prosecution for the same homicide by the civil justice system in 
the then-U.S. territory of the Philippines.109 The Articles of War, through 
 
 
(observing that because the states and the federal government “have separate jurisdictions . . . it may 
sometimes happen that a person is amenable to both jurisdictions for one and the same act,” 
consequently “[h]e owes allegiance to two sovereignties, and claims protection from both”; “[h]e owes 
allegiance to the two departments, so to speak, and within their respective spheres must pay the 
penalties which each exacts for disobedience to its laws. In return, he can demand protection from 
each within its own jurisdiction.”).  
 103. Lanza, 260 U.S. at 381. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959). 
 106. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).  
 107. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2003).  
 108. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985).  
 109. 206 U.S. 333 (1907).  
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which Congress had established court martial jurisdiction, conferred upon 
courts martial a general peacetime “jurisdiction to try an officer or soldier 
of the Army for any offense, not capital, which the civil law declares to be 
a crime against the public.”110 The Court explained that this authorization 
was limited to those crimes “in violation of public law enforced by the 
civil power” in the territory where the court martial sat.111 Based on this 
general authorization, the court martial prosecuted Grafton for “the crime 
of homicide as defined by the Penal Code of the Philippines.”112 Because 
the court martial applied the civil law definition of homicide, the Court 
found that the successive civil court prosecution at issue in the case was 
“for the identical offense.”113  
The Supreme Court then turned to the argument that, notwithstanding 
the court martial use of the Filipino criminal code definition of homicide, 
the military and civil authorities in a U.S. territory constituted distinct 
sovereigns—each with an independent power to prescribe offenses and to 
prosecute—and consequently no double jeopardy barrier arose to block a 
successive civil court prosecution for the same acts.114 The Court rejected 
this argument and resolved the issue entirely in terms of jurisdiction.115  
Because Congress had exclusive prescriptive jurisdiction over the 
territories, and created the territorial courts and authorized their 
adjudicative jurisdiction, the courts were capable of applying only U.S. 
law.116 The Court found “[t]he jurisdiction and authority of the United 
States over that territory and its inhabitants, for all legitimate purposes of 
government, is paramount.”117 It followed that “[i]f . . . a person be tried 
for an offense in a tribunal deriving its jurisdiction and authority from the 
United States and is acquitted or convicted, he cannot again be tried for the 
same offense in another tribunal deriving its jurisdiction and authority 
from the United States.”118 Since both the military court martial and the 
territorial civil court derived jurisdiction from the U.S. government, and 
thus necessarily prosecuted for a crime against the laws of the United 
 
 
 110. Id. at 351. 
 111. Id. at 348. Indeed, “[t]he act done is a civil crime, and the trial is for that act.” Id. at 347. The 
only reason the trial would take place in military court, and not civil court, is that the military court 
had personal jurisdiction over the accused (although the civil courts also could prosecute if they were 
to first gain custody). Id.  
 112. Id. at 349.  
 113. Id.  
 114. Id. at 351. 
 115. Id. at 352. 
 116. Id. at 354–55. 
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. at 352. 
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States, “a second trial of the accused for that crime in the same or another 
court, civil or military, of the same government” violated double 
jeopardy.119  
The origins and development of the dual sovereignty doctrine thus 
clearly show that the term “sovereign” as it has been used by the Supreme 
Court is best understood as the legal concept of jurisdiction and, more 
specifically, independent jurisdiction to prescribe law. Parts III and IV 
show how this understanding fits international law and practice, and Part 
V uses it to expose constitutional deficiencies in the Supreme Court’s 
present dual sovereignty analysis.  
III. AS APPLIED TO THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM  
This Part adapts to the international legal system the argument that 
sovereignty in the double jeopardy context really means independent 
jurisdiction to prescribe law. I discern two kinds of prescriptive 
jurisdiction in international law. One kind I label “national jurisdiction”; 
the other I label “international jurisdiction.” National jurisdiction derives 
from what we typically think of as sovereignty in international law and 
relations. It springs from independent entitlements of each individual state 
vis-à-vis other states in the international system to make and apply its own 
law—principally, from entitlements over national territory and persons. 
We might think of national courts exercising national jurisdiction and 
applying national law in the international system as roughly analogous to 
U.S. state courts applying their own state’s law in the U.S. federal system.  
What I will refer to as international jurisdiction, on the other hand, 
derives from a state’s shared entitlement—along with all other states as 
members of the international system—to enforce international law. At the 
risk of stretching an analogy beyond its natural breaking point, we might 
think of national courts exercising international jurisdiction, and thus 
applying and enforcing international law, as roughly analogous to U.S. 
 
 
 119. Id. On this logic, the Court later found that a municipality is not a distinct sovereign from a 
state because, like Congress’s power over the territories, the state legislature had the power “to 
establish, and to abolish, municipalities[,] to provide for their government, to prescribe their 
jurisdiction and powers, and to alter or amend the same at any time.” Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 
393 (1970) (internal quotations omitted). This comports with “the traditional view . . . that . . . the 
constitutional status of local governments [rests] entirely on the theory that a local government is 
merely an administrative arm of the state, utterly lacking in autonomy or in constitutional rights 
against the state that created it.” Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local 
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 85 (1990); see also id. at 7–8.  
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federal courts geographically sitting in different U.S. states but applying 
and enforcing the same federal law.  
In short, two different kinds of entitlements authorize two different 
kinds of jurisdiction, and ultimately come to represent two different kinds 
of lawgivers or “sovereigns” for double jeopardy purposes: one national 
and the other international. This analysis produces three basic double 
jeopardy rules for the international legal system that will be illustrated 
below.  
A. National Jurisdiction 
If sovereignty really means jurisdiction within the meaning of the dual 
sovereignty doctrine, translating the doctrine to the international realm 
creates an instant linguistic circularity. The reason is that the term 
sovereignty is often invoked to imply that which authorizes a nation-
state’s jurisdiction in the first place, to wit: State A has jurisdiction over 
State A territory because State A is “sovereign” over its territory. Hence 
the regularly invoked combination: “sovereign jurisdiction.” And hence 
the circularity: sovereign = jurisdiction = sovereign again within the 
meaning of the dual sovereignty doctrine.  
Our first step is to unpack this circularity. We can begin by breaking 
out what we mean by the first “sovereign” in the equation; that is, by 
considering what authorizes an individual state’s jurisdiction under 
international law. Here the first “sovereign” is shorthand, again containing 
no real independent analytic force,120 for an established list of state 
entitlements121 recognized by international law that, taken together, 
essentially define the state as a “state.”122 For example, principal among 
these entitlements is power over a certain piece of geographic territory.123 
To avoid too much confusion, instead of calling these entitlements 
“sovereign” entitlements we can call them “national” entitlements. Thus 
State A has jurisdiction over State A territory because of State A’s national 
entitlement, as recognized by international law, over its territory. And 
 
 
 120. See supra Part I.A. 
 121. I borrow the “entitlement” terminology here from Anthony D’Amato. See Anthony 
D’Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1110, 1113 (1982) 
[hereinafter D’Amato, Human Rights]; Anthony D’Amato, Is International Law Really “Law”?, 79 
NW. U. L. REV. 1293, 1308 (1984) [hereinafter D’Amato, Is International Law Really “Law”?]. For a 
recent interesting and persuasive discussion of the universal jurisdictional entitlement to prosecute, see 
Eugene Kontorovich, The Inefficiency of Universal Jurisdiction, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 389 (observing 
the inefficiencies and obstacles universal jurisdiction poses to international peace-making).  
 122. D’Amato, Is International Law Really “Law”?, supra note 121, at 1308. 
 123. Id.  
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instead of calling this State A’s “sovereign jurisdiction” we can call it 
State A’s “national jurisdiction.” Accordingly, national entitlement = 
national jurisdiction = sovereign within the meaning of the dual 
sovereignty doctrine.  
The list of entitlements recognized by international law authorizing a 
state’s national jurisdiction is fairly intuitive. As already mentioned, a 
state legitimately may claim jurisdiction over activity that occurs, even in 
substantial part, within its territory.124 This is called subjective 
territoriality.125 A state also may claim jurisdiction over activity that does 
not occur but that has an effect within its territory, or what is called 
objective territoriality.126 Furthermore, a state may claim jurisdiction over 
activity that involves its nationals.127 Where the acts in question are 
committed by a state’s nationals, the state may claim active personality 
jurisdiction.128 And where the acts victimize a state’s nationals, the state 
may claim passive personality jurisdiction.129 Additionally, under the 
protective principle a state may claim jurisdiction over activity that is 
directed against the state’s security and/or its ability to carry out official 
state functions, such as its exclusive right to print state currency.130  
Each of these entitlements relates distinctly back to the particular state 
claiming jurisdiction—whether to its territory, to punishing or protecting 
its nationals, or to affirming its very statehood.131 And because 
international law recognizes multiple national entitlements, there may well 
be multiple states with national jurisdiction over a given activity. Thus 
Germany may claim jurisdiction over acts committed by a German 
national in the United States,132 but clearly so too may the United States.133 
In such cases there are overlapping or concurrent national jurisdictions.134  
 
 
 124. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 402(1)(a) (1987). 
 125. See id.; see also Harvard Research in Int’l Law, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with 
Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. SUPP. 435, 484–87 (1935) [hereinafter Harvard Research Draft]. 
 126. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 402(1)(c); see also Harvard Research Draft, supra note 125, at 487–94. 
 127. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(2). 
 128. See id.; see also BARTON LEGUM, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION STRATEGIES AND PRACTICE 
211 (American Bar Association 2005); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: U.S. 
LAW AND PRACTICE 346–49 (3d ed. 1996). 
 129. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(2) 
cmt. g.  
 130. Id. § 402(3) cmt. f. 
 131. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Defining the Limits: Universal Jurisdiction and National Courts, 
in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 168 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004).  
 132. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 
§ 402(2). 
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Yet the list of national entitlements also circumscribes the jurisdiction 
of states. While the entitlements authorize the projection of one state’s 
laws to activity taking place in other states, for example where activity 
abroad affects the first state’s territory or involves its nationals, such 
extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction still requires some measurable and 
objective nexus to the first state’s national entitlements.135 For instance, 
absent some nexus, Germany may not apply its racial hate speech laws to 
speech by U.S. nationals, speaking only in the United States and having no 
connection to Germany.  
Finally, within the parameters of its national jurisdiction a state enjoys 
a relatively free hand under international law to exercise its lawgiving 
power however it chooses. With the notable exception that it may not 
prescribe laws contrary to fundamental norms of international law136—for 
example, a state may not, under international law, legislatively endorse or 
permit genocide137—international law leaves states at great liberty to 
regulate whatever conduct they deem deserving of regulation in essentially 
whatever regulatory terms they like. Thus the United States claims 
jurisdiction over acts that occur in the United States or involve U.S. 
nationals, and Germany claims jurisdiction over acts that occur in 
Germany or involve German nationals. And both the United States and 
Germany may pass whatever laws they like, in pretty much whatever 
terms they like, criminalizing pretty much whatever activity they like, 
where that activity takes place within their geographic borders or involves 
their nationals. 
To sum up then, international law contains multiple bases of national 
jurisdiction. These bases of jurisdiction, or sources of lawgiving power, 
derive from a state’s independent national entitlements as recognized by 
international law; namely, the state’s entitlement over its territory, its 
entitlement to punish and protect its nationals, and its entitlement to secure 
itself as a state. Moreover, when states seek to regulate activity falling 
within the compass of their national jurisdiction, they largely are free to 
 
 
 133. See id. § 402(1)(a). 
 134. See, e.g., Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 30-1 (Sept. 
7).  
 135. See Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism 
and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 121, 169–75 (2007).  
 136. Cf. Marcel Brus, Bridging the Gap between State Sovereignty and International Governance: 
The Authority of Law, in STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 24 (Gerard 
Kreijen ed., Oxford 2004). 
 137. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 
U.N.T.S. 277. 
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employ their domestic lawgiving apparatus however they see fit by 
defining offenses according to their own individual—and independent—
lawgiving prerogatives. It follows that when a state prescribes an offense 
against its laws and exercises its adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction 
by prosecuting the perpetrator of that offense, the state is exercising its 
own national entitlements. Or, we might say—to borrow the Supreme 
Court’s phrase—it “is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of . . . other 
[sovereigns].”138  
B. International Jurisdiction 
While each base of national jurisdiction just described relies upon some 
nexus to a national entitlement of the state claiming jurisdiction, which 
authorizes and circumscribes the reach of that state’s national lawgiving 
authority in relation to other states, there is another base of jurisdiction in 
international law that requires no nexus at all. That base is universal 
jurisdiction.139 According to this doctrine, the very commission of certain 
crimes denominated universal under international law engenders 
jurisdiction for all states irrespective of where the crimes occur or which 
state’s nationals are involved.140 The category of universal crime began 
long ago with piracy,141 expanded in the wake of World War II, and is now 
generally considered to include serious international human rights and 
humanitarian law violations like genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, torture, and, most recently, certain crimes of terrorism.142  
Instead of deriving from a state’s independent national entitlements, 
universal jurisdiction derives from the commission of the crime itself 
under international law. It is the international nature of the crime—its very 
substance and definition under international law—that gives rise to 
jurisdiction for all states. Thus while a state may not, without a nexus to its 
national entitlements, extend its national prescriptive reach into the 
territories of other states, international law extends everywhere and 
 
 
 138. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922). 
 139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 
(1987). 
 140. See id.; Leila Nadya Sadat, Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects: 
Redefining Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 241, 246 (2001). 
 141. See United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 197 (1820).  
 142. See, e.g., United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 (1987)); see 
also THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION Principle 2(1) (Stephen Macedo ed., 
2001), available at http://www.law.depaul.edu/centers_institutes/ihrli/downloads/Princeton%20 
Principles.pdf. 
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without limitation the international prohibition on universal crimes.143 
Universal jurisdiction consequently has nothing to do with any particular 
state’s independent national jurisdiction; rather it is a base of international 
jurisdiction: it authorizes states not to enforce any distinctly national 
entitlement but to enforce a shared international entitlement to suppress 
universal crimes as prescribed by international law.144  
For instance, justifying Israel’s jurisdiction in the famous Eichmann 
case over war crimes and crimes against humanity committed before the 
state of Israel even existed, the Israeli Supreme Court explained: 
“[I]nternational law [enforces itself] by authorizing the countries of the 
world to mete out punishment for the violation of its provisions, which is 
effected by putting these provisions into operation either directly or by 
virtue of municipal legislation which has adopted and integrated them.”145 
More recently, Spain’s Constitutional Court made the point emphatically 
when it upheld universal jurisdiction over crimes committed in Guatemala 
by Guatemalans against Guatemalans, and having no link to Spain: “The 
international . . . prosecution which the principle of universal justice seeks 
to impose is based exclusively on the specific characteristics of the crimes 
which are subject to it, where the damage (as in the case of genocide) 
transcends the specific victims and affects the International Community as 
a whole.”146 The Court emphasized that “the prosecution and punishment 
of [universal crimes] constitute not just a shared commitment but also a 
shared interest of all States, and the legitimacy of this [jurisdiction], as a 
consequence, does not depend on particular interests of each of the States 
 
 
 143. This argument is spelled out in more detail in Anthony J. Colangelo, The Legal Limits of 
Universal Jurisdiction, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 149 (2007).  
 144. Professor Sadat distinguishes between “universal international jurisdiction,” exercised by the 
international community through international tribunals, and “universal inter-state jurisdiction,” 
exercised by individual states through national courts. Sadat, supra note 140, at 246–47; Leila Nadya 
Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. 
L.J. 381, 412 (2000); Leila Nadya Sadat, Exile, Amnesty and International Law, 81 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 955, 974–75 (2006). This helpfully explains the difference between international adjudicative 
jurisdiction, created by international tribunal statutes, and national adjudicative jurisdiction, created by 
national law. My argument here is that as a matter of prescriptive jurisdiction individual states 
exercising universal jurisdiction are acting as decentralized enforcers of international law. By their 
very nature, universal prescriptions—whether adjudicated by international tribunals or national 
courts—derive from the same source of lawgiving authority: international law. The adjudicative bodies 
that apply this law may be creatures of either international treaty or national legislation, but they are 
enforcing the same—international—law.  
 145. Israel v. Eichmann [1962] IsrSC 16(1) 2033, reprinted in 2 LEON FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF 
WAR 1664 (Fred L. Israel & William Hansen eds., 1972).  
 146. Guatemala Genocide, STC, Sept. 26, 2005 (No. 237), available at http://www.tribunal 
constitucional.es/jurisprudencia/Stc2005/STC2005-237.html (English translation on file with author).  
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. . . [and] is not configured around links of connection founded on 
particular state interests.”147  
The upshot is that while states collectively through their common and 
coordinated practice contribute to international lawmaking, including the 
law of universal jurisdiction, a single state cannot unilaterally and 
subjectively determine what crimes are within its universal jurisdiction—
that is a matter of international, not national, law.148 For example, 
Germany cannot just decide on its own that racial hate speech is now a 
universal crime over which it might assert jurisdiction around the world, 
including racial hate speech in the United States involving U.S. nationals 
and having no connection to Germany. Of course, states control whether 
and to what degree their courts may enforce universal jurisdiction. 
Depending on how their domestic laws view international law, states often 
must legislatively implement or “transform” this international legal power 
of universal jurisdiction into their national laws so that they might exercise 
it in domestic courts.149 But what is important is that Germany, or any 
other state, cannot unilaterally define its universal jurisdiction in relation 
to other states, that is to say, the crimes giving rise to such jurisdiction—
again, that is exclusively a matter of international law.  
Because the crime itself generates jurisdiction, courts must use the 
definition of that crime, as prescribed by international law, when 
prosecuting on universal jurisdiction grounds; otherwise there is no 
jurisdiction. Thus the exercise of universal adjudicative jurisdiction by 
states (through their courts) depends fundamentally on the application of 
the substantive law of universal prescriptive jurisdiction. And this 
substantive law, or the definitions of universal crimes, is a matter of 
international law. Where courts invent or exaggerate the definition of the 
crime on which they claim universal jurisdiction, their jurisdiction 
conflicts with “the very international law upon which it purports to 
rely.”150 Although universal jurisdiction is a customary international law, 
the most accurate and readily available definitions of universal crimes 
appear in treaties, which largely embody the customary definitions.151  
The takeaway for the present thesis is that universal jurisdiction is 
foundationally different from national jurisdiction. Its jurisdictional anchor 
for states, or source of lawgiving power, is distinctly international—i.e., 
 
 
 147. Id.  
 148. Colangelo, supra note 143, at 161. 
 149. See infra notes 172–73. 
 150. Colangelo, supra note 143, at 153. 
 151. Id. at 169–82. 
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the international legal system’s interest in suppressing certain international 
crimes no matter where they occur and whom they involve. Furthermore, 
when individual states wish to implement their universal jurisdiction 
through domestic legislation and enforce it in domestic courts, they are 
constrained to determine the crimes they adjudicate as the crimes are 
determined under international law. A state may not—as it may when 
exercising its national jurisdiction—criminalize essentially any activity it 
likes in any terms it likes according to its own independent lawgiving 
prerogative. The primary lawgiver, rather, is the international legal system, 
and individual states exercising universal jurisdiction merely act as 
decentralized enforcement vehicles for that lawgiver.  
C. Three Rules of International Double Jeopardy 
Based on the foregoing analysis of the international law of jurisdiction, 
I want to lay down three basic rules of international double jeopardy: 
Rule (1): a national prosecution applying and enforcing a national law 
does not erect a bar to successive prosecutions by other states with 
national jurisdiction over the crime in question; similarly, 
Rule (2): a national prosecution applying and enforcing a national law 
that incorporates an international legal prohibition on a universal crime 
does not erect a bar to successive prosecutions by other states with 
national jurisdiction over the crime in question; however,  
Rule (3): a national prosecution applying and enforcing a national law 
that incorporates an international legal prohibition on a universal crime 
does erect a bar to successive prosecutions that rely only upon 
international (i.e., universal) jurisdiction—that is, to successive 
prosecutions that lack a recognized national basis for jurisdiction or nexus 
to the crime and would be prohibited in the absence of universal 
jurisdiction.  
To illustrate, suppose a U.S. national is alleged to have committed 
torture in Egypt. Clearly Egypt may exercise prescriptive jurisdiction and 
may apply Egyptian law proscribing torture to activity committed in its 
territory.152 Under international law, the United States also may exercise 
prescriptive jurisdiction and may apply U.S. law proscribing torture to 
activity committed by its national.153 Thus we easily have two states that 
potentially may claim jurisdiction under international law. But that is not 
 
 
 152. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 402(1)(a) (1987). 
 153. See id. § 402(2).  
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all. For Spain, among other states,154 has a universal jurisdiction law that 
allows Spanish courts to prosecute for torture, wherever it occurs and 
whomever it involves.155 So it too conceivably could exercise jurisdiction 
on these facts.156  
Now suppose the United States prosecutes this particular individual for 
torture using the federal code provision implementing the international 
Convention Against Torture157 (which explicitly provides for jurisdiction 
over torture committed outside the United States where, inter alia, “the 
alleged offender is a national of the United States”158). Is there a double 
jeopardy bar to a successive prosecution by Egypt for the same torture? 
How about to a successive prosecution by Spain? How about by any other 
state in the world with a universal jurisdiction law prohibiting torture? 
According to a jurisdictional theory of double jeopardy, if the United 
States prosecutes under a U.S. law that incorporates the international 
prohibition on torture, Egypt still may prosecute—for the same act of 
torture—on an Egyptian law that also incorporates the international 
prohibition on torture.159 The reason, as we know, is that Egypt is an 
independent lawgiver with an independent national jurisdiction to apply its 
laws to acts taking place within its territory. Hence we have (1) an 
application of U.S. law prohibiting torture, and (2) an application of 
Egyptian law prohibiting torture. No problem; that is what dual 
sovereignty is all about.  
What about Spain? Unlike Egypt, it has no national jurisdiction on 
these facts. If the crime were instead an “ordinary” crime, say a robbery in 
an Egyptian marketplace by a U.S. national, Spain could not apply and 
 
 
 154. See Austria’s Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] § 64(1) ¶ 6 (Austria), translated in LUC 
REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 94 
(2003); Belgium’s Code de procédure pénale, titre préliminare, article 12 bis, translated in REYDAMS, 
supra, at 105; Denmark’s Straffeloven [Strfl] § 8(1)(5), translated in REYDAMS, supra, at 127; 
Germany’s Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] § 6, translated in REYDAMS, supra, at 142; Wet 
Internationale Misdrijven (International Crimes Act), Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 
[Stb.] 270 (Netherlands).  
 155. Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial [L.O.P.J.] 6/1985, B.O.E. 1985, 157. 
 156. This was precisely Spain’s jurisdictional justification for its famous extradition request for 
Pinochet. 
 157. 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2000); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 (1988), 1465 
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture Convention]. 
 158. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(b)(1).  
 159. Egypt is also a state party to the Torture Convention. See OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT LEGAL 
ADVISOR FOR TREATY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE (2006), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/66286.pdf. Therefore, it has an obligation to “take 
effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory 
under its jurisdiction.” Torture Convention, supra note 157, art. 2.  
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enforce Spanish national law over that crime. Rather, for Spain to 
prosecute, it must rely uniquely upon its international jurisdiction over the 
universal crime of torture. And that is indeed what states claim to do when 
they exercise universal jurisdiction.160 The Spanish national law used to 
prosecute is therefore really just a shell, with no self-supporting national 
jurisdictional basis, through which Spain applies and enforces 
international law. My contention is that because Spain has no independent 
national jurisdiction to apply its own national law, but must rely uniquely 
on a shared international jurisdiction to apply international law, Spain 
would be blocked from prosecuting by the prior U.S. prosecution on a 
jurisdictional theory of double jeopardy.  
If we were to stop right here, the argument might not be entirely 
convincing—especially to those who tend to favor increased use of 
universal jurisdiction and who support international criminal tribunals that 
purport to apply, and base their jurisdiction in, international law161 (a 
phenomenon I will discuss in light of my thesis in the next Part162). Such a 
reader might respond that even if Spain has no national jurisdiction, it 
surely has an international jurisdiction to prosecute for the torture in 
question. After all, that is what universal jurisdiction is all about. Put 
another way, why can’t we have: (1) an application of U.S. law prohibiting 
torture; (2) an application of Egyptian law prohibiting torture; and (3) an 
application of international law (by Spanish courts) prohibiting torture? 
There seem to be three separate laws deriving from three separate sources 
of lawgiving power, and that would justify three separate prosecutions 
under a jurisdictional theory.  
Yet such a response would not be quite right, for the reason that by 
prosecuting under a U.S. law that incorporates the international prohibition 
on torture, the United States simultaneously applies and enforces both U.S. 
national law and international law. And this application and enforcement 
of international law operates to block the Spanish proceedings since Spain 
is jurisdictionally constrained to apply and enforce that same law, i.e., 
international law. We are left, in other words, with the paradigmatic 
double jeopardy protection: you cannot be prosecuted for the same 
offense, under the same law, twice.163  
But my argument still may look lacking to the rigorous supporter of 
what I have labeled international jurisdiction, whether it is exercised by 
 
 
 160. See supra notes 145–47.  
 161. Sadat, supra note 140, at 251.  
 162. See infra Part IV.D.  
 163. See, e.g., Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 352 (1907).  
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universal jurisdiction courts or international tribunals. Indeed we already 
have posited that the U.S. law is identical to the Egyptian law, and we 
would allow Egypt to prosecute successively. So why not allow Spain (or 
an international tribunal) to prosecute using international law? That is to 
say, we still seem to have three separate laws—(1) U.S., (2) Egyptian, and 
(3) international—so why not allow three separate prosecutions? Who’s to 
say that the United States necessarily applies and enforces international 
law in addition to its national law so as to block the Spanish proceedings? 
We seem to be stuck in a sort of metaphysical quagmire with no 
apparent way out apart from academic fiat. Either the United States applies 
and enforces international law along with its national law or it does not. I 
can say it does as much as I like, but that would just be my saying so with 
no principled reason supporting my conclusion. To pull ourselves out of 
this quagmire we must return to what we mean by the term “sovereign” in 
the double jeopardy context; namely, the sovereign as independent 
lawgiver.  
We are clear that within this meaning of sovereign the United States is 
one sovereign and Egypt is another. Each has an independent jurisdiction 
to prescribe law with respect to certain national entitlements, primary 
among them entitlements over national territory and persons. Moreover, 
each has some centralized legislative or lawgiving body that formally 
performs this function. Because we have independent lawgivers, we have 
independent laws that proscribe independent offenses, even if facially the 
laws and the offenses look the same. As a result, an individual may be 
prosecuted under an identical-looking law for an identical-looking offense 
multiple times because the two offenses are, by virtue of the multiple 
sources of lawgiving authority proscribing them, in fact separate—each 
against a different sovereign.164  
But now we turn to international law. Where is the sovereign, the 
lawgiver? It is certainly nothing so formal and centralized as the U.S. 
Congress or the Egyptian parliament. There is no overarching international 
legislature that hands down laws for all the world to obey. Rather, the 
international lawmaking process occurs mainly by aggregating the 
interactions of single actors in the international system—individual nation-
states.165 It is made either through treaty, whereby individual states create 
and bind themselves to rules by signing and ratifying international legal 
 
 
 164. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985). 
 165. See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 323 (1967). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss4/1
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009] DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND MULTIPLE SOVEREIGNS 801 
 
 
 
 
instruments,166 or through custom, which, to borrow one popular 
definition, “results from a general and consistent practice of states 
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”167 Now the United 
States, like every state, is part of the international lawmaking collective. It 
is also part of the international law-applying and law-enforcing 
collective.168 Thus when the United States prosecutes a torturer, and that 
prosecution incorporates international law, the United States applies and 
enforces international, as well as national, law. There is, in other words, no 
independent “international sovereign” in the way that there would be an 
independent national sovereign in the government of Egypt. Rather the 
“sovereignty,” or lawgiving and applying power, of the international legal 
system is invariably bound up in the individual states that make and apply 
international law in decentralized fashion, of which the United States is 
one.  
Where the United States applies the international prohibition on torture 
in its courts, Spain cannot then come along and claim itself to be the 
international law-enforcer if the United States already has performed that 
function. It is conceptually no different than someone being prosecuted in 
the Second Circuit under a federal law, and then the same person being 
prosecuted in the Ninth Circuit for the same offense under the same 
federal law. Such a prosecution plainly would be barred by the prohibition 
on double jeopardy,169 and the doctrine of dual sovereignty cannot pretend 
to save it. 
A final question perhaps of more practical than theoretical concern is 
how to tell whether a national court has, in fact, applied and enforced 
international law so as to block future universal jurisdiction prosecutions 
by other states. Assuming for the moment a good faith prosecution and a 
fair procedure designed to achieve justice,170 I would submit that where 
the law upon which a national prosecution is based reflects the core 
international substance and definition of the crime—and again, treaty law 
ordinarily will supply the best marker171—the national prosecution 
enforces international law. Depending on how states view international 
law, some may claim to apply it directly through their courts while others 
will implement it via national legislation into a domestic rule of decision. 
 
 
 166. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§§ 102(3), 301 (1987).  
 167. Id. § 102(2).  
 168. KELSEN, supra note 165, at 323. 
 169. Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 352 (1907). 
 170. I deal with the possibility of sham trials infra Part V.E.  
 171. See supra note 151.  
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Thus in the U.S. context we can be fairly confident that where a federal 
code provision implements U.S. treaty obligations to criminalize at the 
national level certain internationally proscribed conduct, and that code 
provision tracks faithfully the definition of the crime as set forth in the 
treaty (which U.S. code provisions tend to do),172 a good faith prosecution 
under the code in U.S. court will have applied the international legal 
prohibition to the conduct in question. Civil law countries, by contrast, 
often have more general enabling clauses that allow courts to apply and 
enforce international law more directly.173  
The reflexive objection that there inevitably will be variation from state 
to state on the precise definition of, say, torture or crimes against 
humanity, fails to appreciate fully the decentralized and organic nature of 
the international legal system. There will of course be variation, but some 
margin of appreciation174 in enforcing international law is probably 
unavoidable given how decentralized enforcement of international law 
actually works: through states’ national laws and procedures. Indeed, even 
in the far more centralized U.S. system, if there is a circuit split as to the 
definition of a federal offense with different circuits adopting different 
interpretations, it does not follow that a defendant may be prosecuted 
multiple times for that same offense by different courts sitting in 
disagreeing circuits.175 And while there is no ultimate appeals court in the 
international system like the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve definitional 
disagreements,176 states have other ways of resolving international legal 
conflicts,177 the outcome of which will only help further to determine the 
definition in dispute as a matter of customary international law.178  
In fact, and as I will explain in more depth in the next Part,179 this sort 
of national enforcement of international law appears to be exactly what the 
 
 
 172. See Colangelo, supra note 143, at 189–201.  
 173. See, e.g., Belgium’s Code de procédure pénale, titre préliminare, article 12 bis, translated in 
REYDAMS, supra note 154, at 105; Colangelo, supra note 135, at 175–77 & nn.82–91.  
 174. The margin of appreciation doctrine was first developed by the European Court of Human 
Rights and accords leeway to national governments in implementing international legal obligations. 
Lawless v. Ireland, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 408 (1960–1961). For discussion of its application to 
international criminal law, see Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Nationalizing International Criminal Law, 41 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 30–31 (2005).  
 175. For an example of such a split, compare United States v. Ressam, 474 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 
2007), with United States v. Rosenberg, 806 F.2d 1169 (3d Cir. 1986) (differing interpretations for 
whether a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2) requires that explosives be carried not only “during” 
a felony as per the statute, but also “in relation to” that felony).  
 176. See United States v. Ressam, 128 S. Ct. 1858 (2008) (resolving circuit split supra note 175).  
 177. Colangelo, supra note 143, at 183–85. 
 178. Id.  
 179. See infra Part IV.D.  
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double jeopardy provisions of international tribunal statutes have in mind. 
The provisions protect an individual from a successive tribunal 
prosecution where that individual previously has been tried in good faith 
for the same criminal act in national court.180 The prior national court 
prosecution already would have enforced international law over the act in 
question, thus precluding the tribunal from enforcing that same law again. 
But there is an exception to this double jeopardy bar, one that is very 
telling in light of the discussion above: the tribunal may well prosecute 
again where “the act for which [the individual] was tried was characterized 
as an ordinary crime”181—in other words, where the national prosecution 
did not use the international substance and definition of the crime, and 
thus did not enforce international law.  
Before showing how the rules above explain international law and 
practice, I want to drive home the argument with a frequently 
misunderstood international law opinion by the Supreme Court from 1820, 
the same year the concurrent jurisdiction language relating to federal and 
state prosecutions first appeared in Court’s jurisprudence. United States v. 
Furlong182 has been misread and miscited by leading commentators as 
contrary to the dual sovereignty doctrine of double jeopardy.183 Yet 
Furlong in fact supports the doctrine under a certain explanatory theory—
specifically, the jurisdictional theory just articulated.  
The relevant portion of the opinion addresses in dicta the question of 
double jeopardy in respect of the international crime of piracy on the one 
hand and the parochial crime of murder on the other. Piracy, as a result of 
a legal fiction of the time, was outside the national jurisdiction of any 
state;184 by its very definition no state had national jurisdiction over piracy 
 
 
 180. See infra Part IV.D.  
 181. See infra note 295 (quoting the ICTY and ICTR statutes) (emphasis added).  
 182. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820).  
 183. See Allen & Ratnaswamy, supra note 5, at 809 & n.55 (citing Furlong when stating that 
“federal courts were not to try an individual for a crime for which that individual already had been 
prosecuted by another sovereign”); Amar & Marcus, supra note 5, at 26–27 & n.141 (citing Furlong 
when stating that “[i]f England would allow a French judgment to bar retrial, so should America”); 
Franck, supra note 5, at 1098–99. One notable exception is Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa 
v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Reveals About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 111, 144 (2004), who reads the double jeopardy language in the opinion to apply, in my view 
correctly, to prosecutions over piracy based on universal jurisdiction.  
 184. See United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144, 152 (1820); Colangelo, supra note 
135, at 144; see, e.g., Schooner Exch. v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). To ensure that 
pirates were prosecuted wherever they were found and assertions of jurisdiction over them occasioned 
no interference with the sovereignty of other states, pirates were deemed outside of any state’s national 
jurisdiction; see also Justice Scalia’s more recent description in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 
692, 748 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part). Absent the fiction, prosecution of a pirate in custody for 
acts occurring outside the prosecuting state’s territory theoretically could infringe another state’s 
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since the perpetrators were stateless individuals on stateless vessels 
(ominously flying the black flag instead of a national flag).185 According 
to the Court, pirates “were persons on board vessels which throw off their 
national character by cruizing piratically and committing piracy on other 
vessels.”186 Piracy was not “committed against the particular sovereignty 
of a foreign power; but . . . against all nations, including the United 
States.” 187 All states had jurisdiction over piracy not as a matter of their 
national jurisdiction, but under a “universal jurisdiction” (the Court’s 
term) resulting from the crime’s prohibition under the law of nations, 
which all states could enforce.188 Murder, by contrast, was an ordinary 
crime over which each state had national jurisdiction where the crime 
occurred in its territory or, in some cases, where it involved the state’s 
nationals at sea.189 
Just as in the federal system, the existence of double jeopardy 
protection in the international system with respect to these two crimes 
rested explicitly on concepts of jurisdiction. The Court explained that 
piracy “is considered as an offence within the criminal jurisdiction of all 
nations. It is against all, and punished by all; and there can be no doubt 
that the plea of autre fois acquit [already acquitted] would be good in any 
civilized State, though resting on a prosecution instituted in the Courts of 
any other civilized State.”190 A number of commentators have taken this 
language to suggest that double jeopardy among sovereigns was prohibited 
under U.S. and international law back in 1820 before the full development 
of the dual sovereignty doctrine in Supreme Court jurisprudence.191 But in 
so doing they must have failed to read the very next sentence of the 
opinion, which continues: “Not so with the crime of murder.”192 For 
murder, unlike piracy, was not an offense under international law “within 
th[e] universal jurisdiction” of all states, but rather was an offense against 
each state’s national law193: “It is punishable under the laws of each State, 
 
 
sovereignty; specifically, the state (or state’s vessel) where the act occurred because, at the time, 
jurisdiction was strictly territorial in nature and the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction was seen as 
interfering with the sovereignty of the state where the crime occurred.  
 185. See generally DAVID CORDINGLY, UNDER THE BLACK FLAG: THE ROMANCE AND THE 
REALITY OF LIFE AMONG THE PIRATES (1995). 
 186. Klintock, 18 U.S. at 153; see also United States v. Holmes, 18 U.S. 412, 417–19 (1820). 
 187. Klintock, 18 U.S. at 152.  
 188. United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 197 (1820).  
 189. Id. 
 190. Id.  
 191. See supra note 183.  
 192. Furlong, 18 U.S. at 197. 
 193. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss4/1
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009] DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND MULTIPLE SOVEREIGNS 805 
 
 
 
 
and [therefore] an acquittal in [the defendant’s] case would not have been 
a good plea in the Court of Great Britain.”194  
The Court went on to explain that the United States had what we have 
been calling national jurisdiction over murder committed by U.S. citizens 
at sea: “[A]s to our own citizens . . . [U.S.] laws follow[] them every 
where”;195 and that the Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause protected 
these individuals from successive prosecutions by the U.S. government: 
“[I]n our own Courts they are secured by the constitution from being twice 
put in jeopardy of life or member . . . .”196 However, the protection did not 
shield them against successive prosecutions by other states with national 
jurisdiction over the offense: “[I]f [the accused] are also made amenable to 
the laws of another State, it is the result of their own act in subjecting 
themselves to those laws.”197  
Thus as long ago as 1820, the Supreme Court articulated a theory of 
international double jeopardy moored in doctrines of jurisdiction and the 
autonomous lawgiving power of the sovereign. Under this theory, to 
continue the Court’s hypothetical, where the United States and Great 
Britain had independent bases of national jurisdiction over a particular act, 
multiple prosecutions were permissible. But where no distinctly national 
jurisdiction authorized prosecution, where the United States sought to 
prosecute upon its universal jurisdiction to enforce the international law 
against piracy, a double jeopardy plea would have been available in the 
courts of another state exercising that same, shared universal jurisdiction 
to enforce that same international prohibition.198 In the next Part I show 
that this theory continues to explain modern international law and practice.  
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 
This Part uses the jurisdictional theory to explain the existence and 
contours of double jeopardy protections in various areas of international 
law and practice. It evaluates double jeopardy protections in the 
international law of human rights and humanitarian law, extradition and 
cooperation, the statutes of international criminal tribunals, and the 
practice of universal jurisdiction by states. The discussion will show that 
the three rules of international double jeopardy articulated above 
 
 
 194. Id. (emphasis added).  
 195. Id.  
 196. Id.  
 197. Id. at 197–98.  
 198. Id. 
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persuasively explain modern international law and practice relating to 
double jeopardy.  
A. Human Rights and Humanitarian Law  
A main justification, if not the main justification, for double jeopardy 
protection is to guarantee the rights of individuals to be free from 
successive prosecutions for the same crime.199 It is not surprising, 
therefore, that international human rights law contains double jeopardy 
protections, as does the related field of international humanitarian law, 
which protects the rights of individuals in situations of armed conflict. 
However, double jeopardy protection in these areas has a notably limited 
scope: it attaches only to multiple prosecutions or punishments within a 
single state. In other words, the relevant international human rights and 
humanitarian law instruments permit a state to prosecute an individual for 
a crime for which that individual already has been prosecuted and 
punished in another state. The jurisdictional theory explains this lack of 
international double jeopardy protection among different states since, 
under the theory, each state as an independent lawgiver may exercise its 
national jurisdiction to apply and enforce its own laws. 
1. Universal Human Rights Instruments 
Article 14(7) of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) guarantees: “No one shall be liable to be tried or 
punished again for an offence for which he has already been finally 
convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of 
each country.”200 As the language of the provision seems to suggest, the 
prohibition on double jeopardy applies only within “each” state’s judicial 
system.201 The drafting history of the provision explicitly supports this 
interpretation,202 and the quasi-judicial Human Rights Committee, whose 
job it is to interpret and implement the Convention,203 has made clear that 
 
 
 199. See infra Part V.A.  
 200. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14(7), opened for signature Dec. 16, 
1966, S. EXEC. DOC. E 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).  
 201. At least one court has adopted such a plain language reading of the article. See United States 
v. Duarte-Acero, 208 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 202. See MARC J. BOSSUYT, GUIDE TO THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES” OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 316 (1987) (“It was pointed out that a State would be 
free to try, in accordance with its laws, persons already sentenced for the same offence by the courts of 
another country.”).  
 203. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for 
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the scope of Article 14(7)’s double jeopardy protection is limited to 
multiple prosecutions by one state.204  
The leading Committee ruling on the issue involved a complaint by an 
Italian citizen who had been convicted in Switzerland of money laundering 
and was then prosecuted for the same offense in Italy. The complaint 
alleged that the successive Italian prosecution violated Article 14(7)’s 
double jeopardy bar.205 The Italian government rejected this idea of 
“international non bis in idem” and argued that Article 14(7) instead “must 
be understood as referring exclusively to the relationships between judicial 
decisions of a single State and not between those of different States.”206 
The Committee agreed, and in language mirroring that used to articulate 
the jurisdictional theory presented above, explained that “article 14, 
paragraph 7, of the Covenant . . . does not guarantee non his in indem [sic] 
with regard to the national jurisdictions of two or more States. . . . [T]his 
provision prohibits double jeopardy only with regard to an offence 
adjudicated in a given State.”207 Subsequent Human Rights Committee 
decisions have affirmed this interpretation,208 and it has been adopted as 
well by cases in national courts interpreting the Covenant.209  
2. Regional Human Rights Instruments  
Regional human rights instruments containing a bar on double jeopardy 
likewise limit its application to multiple prosecutions by a single state. 
Article 4 of Protocol 7 to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Freedoms, for example, restricts double jeopardy 
protection as follows: “No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again 
in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same State for an 
offence for which he has already been finally acquitted or convicted in 
accordance with the law and penal procedure of that State.”210 And if the 
language itself were not adequately clear that double jeopardy protection 
 
 
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302.  
 204. A.P. v. Italy, Communication No. 204/1986, Report of the Human Rights Comm., 43d Sess., 
supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc. A/43/40 (1988); A.R.J. v. Australia, Communication No. 692/1996, Human 
Rights Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/60/D/692/1996 (July 28, 1997).. 
 205. A.P. v. Italy, U.N. Doc. A/43/40, ¶ 1-2.3.  
 206. Id. ¶ 5.3.  
 207. Id. ¶ 7.3 (emphasis added). 
 208. See A.R.J. v. Australia, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/60/D/692/1996, ¶ 6.4. 
 209. See United States v. Duarte-Acero, 208 F.3d 1282, 1286–89 (11th Cir. 2000); United States 
v. Benitez, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1363–64 (S.D. Fla. 1998).  
 210. Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 4, Nov. 22, 1984, Europ. T.S. 117 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1988) 
(emphasis added). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
808 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:769 
 
 
 
 
does not extend to prosecutions by multiple national jurisdictions, the 
Council of Europe’s Explanatory Report erases all doubt: “The words 
‘under the jurisdiction of the same State’ limit the application of the article 
to the national level.”211 Again, it is the concept of jurisdiction that 
demarcates double jeopardy protection: where there are multiple national 
jurisdictions, there may be multiple prosecutions.212  
3. Humanitarian Law Instruments  
International humanitarian law also contains rules limiting double 
jeopardy. Article 86 to the 1949 Geneva Convention III Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War directs that “No prisoner of war may be 
punished more than once for the same act or on the same charge.”213 
Although the article was approved “unanimously without comment,”214 its 
language suffers from a number of lacunae. Does it protect only against 
multiple punishments and not trials? And more importantly for this 
Article, does it apply only to multiple punishments doled out by one state 
party or does it attach across multiple states?  
The drafting history suggests that the provision applies only to multiple 
punishments by one state, explaining that it was included “to prevent any 
recurrence of certain abuses committed during the Second World War in 
penal matters.”215 The “abuses” are referenced in an additional paragraph 
proposed by the Sub-Committee on Penal and Disciplinary Sanctions, 
elaborating that “[t]he punishment inflicted at the first trial shall not be 
increased as the result of an appeal or a similar procedure.”216 Thus it 
appears that Article 86 was intended to protect against additional 
punishment being heaped on as a result of exercising one’s right to 
“appeal or petition from any sentence,” a right which is guaranteed by 
 
 
 211. Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/ 
Html/117.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2009); see also P. VAN DIJK AND G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 513 (1990).  
 212. The American Convention on Human Rights also contains a double jeopardy prohibition. See 
American Convention on Human Rights art. 8(4), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 
123.  
 213. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 86, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.  
 214. Commentary to Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Aug. 12, 
1949), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/375-590105?OpenDocument. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id.; see 2A FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949, at 326, 
501 (Hein 2004). 
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Article 106.217 Consequently, the provision relates only to multiple 
punishments exacted by one state party.  
Subsequent international instruments more directly spell out the scope 
of double jeopardy protection in modern humanitarian law and expressly 
cabin it to multiple prosecutions by the same state party. Article 75(4)(h) 
to the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions guarantees 
that “[n]o one shall be prosecuted or punished by the same Party for an 
offence in respect of which a final judgement acquitting or convicting that 
person has been previously pronounced under the same law and judicial 
procedure.”218 The narrowness of this protection is consistent with that 
afforded by Article 14(7) of the ICCPR. Indeed, according to the 
Additional Protocol’s Official Rapporteur, “The provision on ne bis in 
idem [in Protocol I] is drawn from the United Nations Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights.”219 
Thus, while human rights and humanitarian law instruments create 
rights against double jeopardy, the instruments self-consciously limit the 
scope of those rights to prohibit only multiple prosecutions by a single 
state. The jurisdictional theory explains why.  
B. International Cooperation  
One area of international law in which individuals clearly are protected 
from successive prosecutions by different states, at least in some 
circumstances, is the law of extradition and cooperation in criminal 
matters. If the legal instruments in this area reflect a general prohibition on 
international double jeopardy they would cut against a jurisdictional 
theory of double jeopardy whereby states with independent jurisdiction to 
prescribe law always retain the independent ability to enforce that law 
through a separate prosecution in their courts.  
1. Extradition 
Extradition treaties uniformly contain mandatory grounds for refusal of 
extradition where the requested individual already has been convicted or 
acquitted of the offense that serves as the basis of the extradition request in 
 
 
 217. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 213, art. 106.  
 218. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 75(4)(h), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 
(entered into force Dec. 7, 1979) (emphasis added). 
 219. YVES SANDOZ ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO 
THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 884 (1987).  
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the state to which the request is directed. For example, the European 
Convention on Extradition states that “[e]xtradition shall not be granted if 
final judgment has been passed by the competent authorities of the 
requested Party upon the person claimed in respect of the offence or 
offences for which extradition is requested.”220 The United Nations Model 
Treaty on Extradition similarly provides that extradition “shall not be 
granted . . . [i]f there has been a final judgment rendered against the person 
in the requested State in respect of the offence for which the person’s 
extradition is requested.”221 In fact, “[w]ith two exceptions, all United 
States extradition treaties negotiated since World War II contain 
provisions prohibiting the extradition of persons convicted, acquitted, or 
being tried in the requested country for the same acts or offenses for which 
their extradition is requested.”222  
The consistency of these provisions throughout the majority of modern 
extradition treaties brings the international lawyer to a bit of a dilemma. 
The dilemma centers on the role of treaties in the international legal 
schema. On the one hand, treaties may be either generative or declarative 
of an underlying international law;223 on the other hand, they may carve 
out an exception to that law for the particular states parties to the treaty. 
For instance, the Genocide Convention establishes the international law 
against genocide—a law that applies generally to all states;224 while a 
treaty setting up a trade regime like the WTO creates rights and 
obligations only for those specific states parties to the treaty—against the 
background of a far more relaxed or even disinterested general 
international law that by and large permits states to trade how they see fit.  
The question we must answer is whether the double jeopardy 
provisions in extradition treaties are generative of an international law 
prohibiting double jeopardy across the board, i.e., across state borders, or 
whether these treaties merely carve out an exception for states parties to 
the treaties against an otherwise permissive international law that allows 
multiple prosecutions by different states. Two possible arguments, only 
one of which withstands scrutiny, tend to support the answer that the 
protection contained in the treaties is the exception, not the rule. 
 
 
 220. European Convention on Extradition art. 9, Dec. 13, 1957, 359 U.N.T.S. 274.  
 221. See U.N. Model Treaty on Extradition, G.A. Res. 45/116, art. 3(d) U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., 
68th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/116 (Dec. 14, 1990). 
 222. MICHAEL ABBELL, EXTRADITION TO AND FROM THE UNITED STATES § 3-2(19), at 113–14 
(2004).  
 223. See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger. v. Den., W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 41 
(Feb. 20). 
 224. See D’Amato, Human Rights, supra note 121, at 1128–48. 
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The first argument, and the one that in my view ultimately must fail, 
takes extradition treaties as a class and contends that because they are 
designed to create exceptions, the rules they contain are also exceptional. 
Extradition treaties depart from the general international rule that states 
have no obligation to extradite.225 In fact the domestic laws of many states, 
including the United States, prohibit extradition in the absence of an 
extradition treaty.226 Thus the entire purpose of an extradition treaty is to 
hew an exception; to create obligations and rights for states parties that 
they otherwise would not have under international law. One could argue 
that the exceptional character of the treaty’s overall object and purpose 
might make awkward the conclusion that a specific provision incidental to 
that object and purpose—such as a provision relating to double jeopardy—
somehow extends to non-party states as a general rule of international law. 
If the overall obligation to extradite is non-generalizable, neither are its 
incidentals.  
But this type of intrapolation from the overall character of extradition 
treaties runs into a strong human rights objection. The reason for the 
double jeopardy bar ostensibly would be to protect the individual from 
states contracting away her rights through the treaty; “from combining to 
do together what each could not . . . do on its own.”227 Thus if extradition 
is the exception to the general rule, human rights are the exception to the 
exception: states may create whatever rules they like amongst themselves, 
except rules that violate fundamental human rights. Hence the Torture 
Convention’s firm command: “No State Party shall . . . extradite a person 
to another State where substantial grounds exist for believing that he 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”228  
This brings us to the second, more persuasive reason why the double 
jeopardy protection contained in extradition treaties is the exception, not a 
generalizable international rule. Unlike the Torture Convention’s absolute 
prohibition on extradition where there is good reason to believe that the 
requested individual will be tortured upon transfer, extradition treaties by 
their own terms restrict the double jeopardy bar to states parties.229 And 
 
 
 225. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 475 
cmt. 1 (1987). 
 226. Id. § 475 cmt. b. 
 227. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 102 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
 228. Torture Convention, supra note 157, art. 3(1). For its part, the European Court of Human 
Rights has observed that extradition where substantial grounds exist to believe that the extradited 
individual will be subject to torture gives rise to state liability under the European Convention’s 
prohibition on torture. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 91 (1989). 
 229. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND 
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even here it applies only to one narrow set of circumstances in the vast 
majority of the treaties230: extradition shall be refused, it will be recalled, 
only where there has been a final judgment rendered against the individual 
in the “requested State.”231  
But what about where the individual already has been convicted or 
acquitted in the requesting state, and is likely to be subject to yet another 
prosecution for the same offense upon return? Or has already been 
convicted or acquitted in a third state? The overwhelming majority of 
extradition treaties are manifestly silent232; and the silence is not 
accidental. Rather it evinces two interrelated points about the treaties: (1) 
they do not purport to establish an unqualified right to be free from double 
jeopardy—often even among states parties; and (2) their double jeopardy 
provisions certainly were not intended to be generalizable to states outside 
the treaty.  
The German Constitutional Court addressed precisely these points 
when a fugitive in Germany challenged his pending extradition to Turkey 
on the grounds that he had already been convicted, and had served his 
time, for the offense in question in Greece.233 Surveying the relevant 
international instruments and evaluating state practice on the point, the 
Court concluded categorically: 
There is presently no general rule of public international law that 
states that a person who has been sentenced to imprisonment in a 
third state and has also served this sentence is unable to be retried or 
reconvicted for the same offence in another state. . . . Similarly, 
there is presently no general rule of public international law 
opposing the permissibility of extradition when the person sought 
has already been imprisoned for the same offence in a third state 
and this time is not accounted for or taken into consideration by the 
state seeking extradition.234 
 
 
PRACTICE 693 & n.332 (4th ed. 2004); Van den Wyngaert & Stessens, supra note 13, at 785. 
 230. See sources cited supra notes 220–22.  
 231. See, e.g., U.N. Model Treaty on Extradition, supra note 221; European Convention on 
Extradition, supra note 220, art. 9.  
 232. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 229, at 693 & n.332; Van den Wyngaert & Stessens, supra note 
13, at 785. 
 233. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 7, 1987, 75 
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfGE] 1 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.utexas. 
edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/german/case.php?id=570.  
 234. Id. at C (intro.). 
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The Court continued (the emphasis is in the original): 
[T]he principle of ne bis in idem is a general rule of public 
international law . . . which prevents the renewed conviction of a 
person sought for the same offence in the same state. On the other 
hand, there are currently no general rules of public international law 
. . . according to which no one may be tried or punished by the 
courts of one state for an offence for which he has already been 
convicted or acquitted by another state or that a sentence served 
abroad must be accounted for in the former state or be taken into 
consideration in sentencing.235  
The double jeopardy provisions in extradition treaties do not evidence a 
general international prohibition on double jeopardy as among different 
states. Instead these provisions merely carve out an exception to the 
general rule allowing double jeopardy among multiple sovereigns. This 
exception, viewed with even a modest degree of skepticism given its 
particularly narrow coverage, may not have much to do at all with the 
individual’s rights when compared with another, apparently more salient 
motivation: the requested state’s sovereign interest in not seeing its own 
proceedings repeated, questioned, or overturned by foreign courts. 
2. Other Cooperation Conventions  
The survey of law in this area would not be complete without 
discussing a few attempts among European states to set up regimes of 
mutual respect of criminal judgments and coordination in criminal matters. 
Each of the agreements behind these regimes contains some form of 
double jeopardy protection. But these too recognize that the (limited) 
protection they afford is the exception and not the rule. The Council of 
Europe’s 1970 Convention on the International Validity of Criminal 
Judgments236 and 1972 Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in 
Criminal Matters237 provide a double jeopardy protection based on a final 
judgment in another member state’s courts.238 The Explanatory Report to 
 
 
 235. Id. at C(2)(a)(3). 
 236. European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments, Europ. T.S. No. 
70 (entered into force May 28, 1970). 
 237. European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters, Europ. T.S. No. 
73 (entered into force May 15, 1972). 
 238. See European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments, supra note 
236, art. 53; European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters, supra note 237, 
art. 35. 
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the Judgments Convention observes that the protection afforded is—and 
was intended to be—an exception to the general permissibility of 
international double jeopardy. It notes that while national systems 
generally prohibit double jeopardy, “[a]t the international level, on the 
other hand, the principle of ne bis in idem is not generally recognised.”239  
Moreover, the Council of Europe deliberately included the 
international double jeopardy clause in a convention dealing with 
cooperation between states parties as opposed to incorporating it by 
protocol into the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms. It did so out of concern that placing it in the 
latter would signal, wrongly, a wider application to non-party states 
unsupported by international law.240 And even this watered-down double 
jeopardy protection failed to take hold because most Council of Europe 
members did not ratify the conventions.241 More recently (and more 
successfully), the European Union put into effect the 1990 Schengen 
Convention242 in anticipation of lifting the internal border controls in 
1993.243 But like the two Council of Europe conventions above, the 
Schengen Convention is an instrument of cooperation intended to carve 
out an exception to the general rule.  
Finally, the scope of the protection itself in these instruments makes 
clear that it is exceptional and, moreover, aligns strongly with a 
jurisdictional theory in which national jurisdiction is based on distinct 
national entitlements. The bar on successive prosecutions in each of the 
cooperation conventions notably does not extend to prosecutions by states 
having jurisdiction on the basis of either territoriality or a variation of the 
protective principle.244 Under the conventions, a state on whose territory 
the offense occurred or against whose public institutions or persons the 
offense was directed always retains the power to prosecute in the face of a 
foreign judgment.245 Thus even while carving out an exception to 
 
 
 239. Council of Europe, Explanatory Report on the Convention on the International Validity of 
Criminal Judgments pt. III, § 1, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/070. 
Htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).  
 240. Id.  
 241. Van den Wyngaert & Stessens, supra note 13, at 787. 
 242. Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 Between the Governments 
of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French 
Republic, on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common Borders, June 19, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 84 
[hereinafter Schengen Convention].  
 243. Van den Wyngaert & Stessens, supra note 13, at 787. 
 244. See European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments, supra note 
236, art. 53(2), (3); European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters, supra 
note 237, art. 35(2), (3); Schengen Convention, supra note 242, art. 55. 
 245. See supra note 244; see also Council of Europe, Explanatory Report on the Convention on 
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international double jeopardy that prevents successive prosecutions by 
different states, the power to make, apply, and enforce law with respect to 
some entitlements—namely, those relating to national territory and 
security—was too valuable for states parties to give up.  
In all, extradition treaties and other international cooperation 
agreements self-consciously operate within a jurisdictional theory of 
double jeopardy. These instruments deliberately carve out limited 
exceptions for states parties to a general international rule allowing 
multiple prosecutions by multiple lawgivers with independent power to 
make and apply law.  
C. General Principles of International Law 
Even where states have not affirmatively undertaken to establish a 
double jeopardy protection at the international level through treaty law, 
their domestic practices may, to borrow a phrase from the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, give rise to “[a] general principle[] of law 
recognized by civilized nations.”246 General principles constitute 
“supplementary rules of international law.”247 While international courts 
and tribunals have on numerous occasions looked to general principles to 
“fill in the gaps” left by the primary source law like treaties and custom,248 
the proper formulation and application of these principles is much 
contested.249 We need not wade too far into the complexity of exactly 
when and how a principle common among domestic legal systems may be 
recruited into a general principle of international law in order to conclude 
that no such generally accepted principle exists with respect to double 
jeopardy among states. 
1. The Hierarchy of Sources Hurdle 
Before we get to the domestic practice, any general principle in this 
area faces a preliminary stumbling block. Their main role as gap-fillers in 
the international jurisprudence could suggest that general principles cannot 
 
 
the International Validity of Criminal Judgments, supra note 239.  
 246. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(c), June 26, 1945, 3 Bevans 1179; 59 
Stat. 1055; T.S. No. 993. 
 247. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(4) 
(1987). 
 248. OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 50–55 (1991); see also 
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A Judgment (Oct. 7, 1997); BIN CHENG, GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (1993).  
 249. See SCHACHTER, supra note 248, at 50–55.  
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supplant an inconsistent rule established by primary international law 
sources like treaties. Primary sources represent the affirmative and 
deliberate consent of states to a rule that binds them on the international 
plane. By contrast, a general principle taken from the domestic practices of 
states has no such international imprimatur. As a matter of the hierarchy of 
sources, the fact that the relevant primary source instruments purposefully 
limit their provisions so as not to create a generally applicable double 
jeopardy rule among states at the international level tends to undermine 
the proposition of this same rule arising (and overriding the primary 
source rule) through a supplemental rule of international law, and one that 
derives from the practices of states in their domestic spheres to boot. One 
might think of the treaties as having “occupied the field”250 here in a way 
that cabins quite conspicuously the rule so as not to prohibit international 
double jeopardy. Indeed, apart from stating flatly, “[t]here is no general 
protection from double jeopardy among different states”—which the 
drafting history and decisional law actually do—it is not clear what else 
the treaties themselves might have done to limit the scope of double 
jeopardy protection to successive prosecutions by a single state.  
There is, however, a rejoinder. By extending double jeopardy 
protection beyond the single state scenario to reach multiple prosecutions 
by different states, the general principle has played precisely its role: it has 
“supplement[ed],”251 not displaced, the primary source rule. And 
moreover, this practice is, by definition, not limited solely to the domestic 
practices of states; recognizing and enforcing an international double 
jeopardy protection in domestic courts is tantamount to recognizing and 
enforcing the criminal judgments of foreign states,252 so there is some 
international dimension here indicative of custom.  
Yet the fact remains that an international rule covering exactly this 
multiple-state scenario was expressly considered—and rejected—by the 
primary international lawmaking instruments directly addressed to the 
issue, leading to the conclusion that the states involved, even while 
engaged in the very business of crafting human rights,253 did not want to 
be bound by a double jeopardy rule at the international level. In any event, 
 
 
 250. This is a term of art used by the United States Supreme Court in evaluating the federal 
government’s power to preempt the states in areas of federal lawmaking. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat’l 
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).  
 251. See supra note 247 and accompanying text. 
 252. On the civil side, the doctrine of res judicata appears to have been accepted for some time as 
a general principle of international law. See Chorzow Factory (Ger. v. Pol.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 
19, at 27 (July 26) (Judge Anzilotti) (cited in CHENG, supra note 248, at 336).  
 253. See supra notes 200–19.  
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and whatever one thinks about the right answer to the sources conundrum, 
domestic practice on the point is so mixed that no principle responsibly 
can be deduced.  
2. International Double Jeopardy Protections in National Law 
Without doubt, most states’ domestic laws contain some type of double 
jeopardy protection,254 whether through constitutional guarantee255 or by 
statutory or common law rule.256 Our question is whether the protection 
attaches in light of prior prosecutions by foreign courts. 
a. Common Law Countries 
Practice in common law countries is sharply divided. U.S. law on the 
point is clear: the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment covers 
only multiple prosecutions by the same sovereign;257 thus different 
prosecutions by different sovereigns, including foreign states, are 
permissible.258 As one court succinctly put it, “[t]he Constitution of the 
United States has not adopted the doctrine of international double 
jeopardy.”259 On the other hand, common law countries like Canada260 and 
England261 offer a more comprehensive protection that shields defendants 
from international double jeopardy in most cases262 where judgment 
 
 
 254. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 154, 155 n.2 (Black, J., dissenting).  
 255. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying 
International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 235, 289 & n.262 (1993).  
 256. See JAY A. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL 
POLICY 125 (1969); Gary di Bianco, Truly Constitutional? The American Double Jeopardy Clause and 
its Australian Analogies, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 123 (1995).  
 257. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 131–33. 
 258. See Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1313 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Richardson, 580 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Martin, 574 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1978); 
United States v. Rashed, 83 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 1999); United States v. Benitez, 28 F. Supp. 2d 
1361 (S.D. Fla. 1998), aff’d, 208 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2000).  
 259. Martin, 574 F.2d at 1360.  
 260. See, e.g., R. v. Leskiw, Morgan and Eedy, [1986] 26 C.C.C. (3d) 166. The Canadian 
Supreme Court has left the issue open. See also R. v. Van Rassel, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 225 (Can.) (giving 
the arguments for and against an international double jeopardy prohibition, but concluding that “it is 
not necessary to decide in this case which of these two positions should prevail”).  
 261. See Treacy v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, [1971] A.C. 537, 562 (H.L.) (Judgment of Lord 
Diplock).  
 262. For an exception, see R. v. Thomas (Keith), [1985] Q.B. 604, in which a British court of 
appeals acknowledged the international prohibition on double jeopardy but refused to apply it to a 
defendant who had been convicted in absentia in Italy and could not be extradited to Italy on the 
grounds that he was never (and would never be) truly twice in “jeopardy.”  
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already has been handed down by a foreign “court of competent 
jurisdiction.”263  
b. Civil Law Countries 
The practice of civil law countries runs the gamut between these two 
poles of total international double jeopardy protection or none at all. Some 
states like Germany264 and Italy265 appear to fall into the U.S. camp and 
provide no international double jeopardy protection,266 while Dutch law 
operates similarly to that of England and Canada in that a valid foreign 
judgment broadly shields the accused from a successive Dutch prosecution 
for the same offense.267  
The rest of civil law practice is somewhere in between. Apart from the 
Netherlands, no civil law country appears to permit a double jeopardy 
claim where the offense takes place within its territory.268 Thus, as with 
the double jeopardy provisions in the cooperation conventions discussed 
above,269 if John commits crime X on State A’s territory, he will always be 
subject to prosecution in State A, even if he already has been convicted or 
acquitted of X in the courts of State B. Again, this practice should not be 
all that surprising. A state’s entitlement to exercise jurisdiction over its 
territory is one of the most important and jealously guarded in the package 
of entitlements that makes the state a state.270 Furthermore, in addition to 
preserving their territorial jurisdictions, many states retain the 
unconditional power to prosecute where the offense takes place 
extraterritorially and affects an important national interest or governmental 
function under the protective principle.271 For example, if John 
counterfeits French currency he will always be subject to prosecution in 
France, even if he perpetrated the act in the United States and was already 
prosecuted for it in U.S. courts.272  
 
 
 263. See R. v. Leskiw, Morgan and Eedy, 26 C.C.C. (3d) 172. 
 264. See Case 45/69, Boehringer Mannheim GmbH v. Commission, 1972 E.C.R. 1281, 1293–95. 
 265. Id. at 1296.  
 266. See Van den Wyngaert & Stessens, supra note 13, at 784.  
 267. Id. at 783 & n.18.  
 268. Id. at 782.  
 269. See supra Part IV.B.2.  
 270. See supra Part III.B. 
 271. See Van den Wyngaert & Stessens, supra note 13, at 784; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(3) cmt. f (1987); I. CAMERON, THE 
PROTECTIVE PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 84–89 (1994).  
 272. See Van den Wyngaert & Stessens, supra note 13, at 784.  
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Outside of the absolute retentions of jurisdiction over crimes affecting 
territory and nationhood, some civil law countries do afford defendants a 
degree of double jeopardy protection based on a foreign prosecution. For 
instance, Belgium offers double jeopardy protection where the offense 
takes place entirely outside Belgium and the state on whose territory the 
offense occurs has rendered a final judgment.273 Thus Belgium essentially 
respects the strength of the other state’s jurisdictional entitlement if 
Belgium’s own entitlement is not as strong. In John’s case, if Belgium is 
State B (the state exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction) and John already 
has been convicted or acquitted in State A (the territorial state), Belgium 
will respect State A’s judgment and afford double jeopardy protection to 
John.274  
The splintered practice among the world’s domestic legal systems 
confirms the Opinion of Advocate General Mayras in the European Court 
of Justice, who, after surveying the domestic laws and practices of a 
number of European states, concluded that state practice was against a 
general principle of international double jeopardy and therefore “the non 
bis in idem rule, which is stated and applied in domestic law, is far from 
being accepted as a general principle of law in international relations.”275 
The absence of a general principle of international law prohibiting 
successive prosecutions by different states is consistent with a 
jurisdictional theory under which different states with independent 
national jurisdiction retain the general ability to prosecute successively for 
the same crime. 
D. International Criminal Tribunal Statutes 
Double jeopardy provisions also appear in the statutes of international 
criminal tribunals. To take some well-known examples, the statutes 
creating the ICTY and ICTR as well as the Rome Statute for the ICC all 
provide for what could be viewed as double jeopardy protection at the 
international level. That is, they all offer some type of shield from 
successive prosecutions as between international tribunals and national 
 
 
 273. Id.  
 274. In reality, this protection is not so easily assured since the concept of territoriality has been 
enlarged to include a broad range of activity including offenses exhibiting only a tangential relation to 
the forum state. See Colangelo, supra note 135, at 128–29. Prosecutors often take advantage of this to 
“convinc[e] courts to localise offences on the territory of their own State.” Van den Wyngaert & 
Stessens, supra note 13, at 784.  
 275. Case 45/69, Boehringer Mannheim GmbH v. Commission, 1972 E.C.R. 1281, 1296. 
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courts.276 The double jeopardy protections contained in the statutes are 
complicated and varied, but their very existence appears to generate 
discord for double jeopardy rules in international law: no general double 
jeopardy protection among states, but double jeopardy protection between 
states and international tribunals.  
This Part uses concepts of jurisdiction to resolve the discord and 
untangle the double jeopardy protections in the statutes. It draws upon the 
manner of creation of the tribunals and their jurisdictional provisions to 
explain how states and international tribunals largely share jurisdiction 
over the activity proscribed by the tribunal statutes. Thus when either a 
state or a tribunal exercises jurisdiction it usually extinguishes the 
jurisdiction of the other, leading to double jeopardy protection between 
them. Where tribunal statutes do allow a successive prosecution, it is 
because the double jeopardy provision in question has reserved a portion 
of either national or international jurisdiction to the state or tribunal, 
respectively, upon which that entity may prosecute.  
1. ICTY and ICTR 
The United Nations Security Council established the ICTY and ICTR 
pursuant to its Chapter VII powers under the U.N. Charter to respond to 
threats to international peace and security in the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda.277 Toward this end, it delegated to the tribunals a certain amount 
of subject matter, geographic and temporal jurisdiction to prosecute for 
serious violations of international law.278 While the jurisdictional 
 
 
 276. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, 
art. 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, art. 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter 
ICTR Statute]; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 20, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (July 17, 1998) [hereinafter ICC statute]; see also Agreement Between the United 
Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
art. 9, Jan. 16, 2002, available at http://www.specialcourt.org/documents/Agreement.htm [hereinafter 
SC Agreement]; Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, S.C. Res. 1757, art. 5, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007).  
 277. See U.N. Charter, art. 39; ICTY Statute, supra note 276, pmbl.; ICTR Statute, supra note 
276, pmbl.; Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 29 (Oct. 2, 1995), available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/ 
appeal/decision-e/51002.htm.  
 278. U.N. Charter, art. 39; see also ICTY Statute, supra note 276; ICTR Statute, supra note 276. 
See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, ¶ 29. The “competence” (competence being another 
word for jurisdiction), of the tribunals, as set for in Article 1 of each statute, exists along three 
dimensions: (1) subject matter, (2) geography, and (3) timeframe. Common Article 1 commands that 
the tribunals “shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for [(1)] serious violations of 
international humanitarian law [(2)] committed in [a] territory” defined by the statutes (the former 
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provisions of the statutes establish concurrent jurisdiction between 
national courts and international tribunals,279 the tribunals enjoy “primacy 
over national courts.”280 The tribunals are accordingly the primary 
enforcers of the international legal prohibitions contained in their statutes. 
As part of this jurisdictional dynamic, “[a]t any stage of the procedure, the 
International Tribunal [] may formally request national courts to defer to 
its competence.”281  
Through its Chapter VII powers, the Security Council altered the 
ordinary rules of international jurisdiction to give the tribunals primacy 
over a special piece of jurisdiction, thereby creating a shared jurisdiction 
between the tribunals on one hand and states on the other. By exercising 
jurisdictional primacy, the tribunal overtakes the sovereignty, or national 
entitlements, of all states to exercise their national jurisdictions. In the 
famous Tadic case (which actually resulted from a transfer of national 
proceedings to the ICTY),282 Tadic directly challenged the ICTY’s 
jurisdiction over him on this basis. He objected specifically to this transfer 
of “State sovereignty” to the tribunal,283 contending that the ICTY’s 
“primacy over domestic courts constitutes an infringement upon the 
sovereignty of the State directly affected.”284 The ICTY Appeals Chamber 
acknowledged that Article 2 of the U.N. Charter prevented the U.N. from 
“interven[ing] in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any State.”285 But it responded by citing “the commanding 
restriction at the end of the same paragraph [of Article 2]: ‘but this 
principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures 
under Chapter VII,’”286 and explained that “[t]hose are precisely the 
provisions under which the International Tribunal has been established.”287  
The Appeals Chamber went on to uphold the primacy of ICTY 
jurisdiction over national courts quoting the Trial Chamber’s conclusion 
that “[o]f course, this involves some surrender of sovereignty by the 
 
 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda), and (3) occurring within a time period defined by the statutes. ICTY Statute, 
supra note 276, art. 1; ICTR Statute, supra note 276, art. 1. The statutes then spell out the international 
crimes within their subject matter jurisdiction, including genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes amounting to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. ICTY Statute, supra note 276, arts. 2, 
3, 4, 5; ICTR Statute, supra note 276, arts. 2, 3, 4.  
 279. ICTY Statute, supra note 276, art. 9(2); ICTR Statute, supra note 276, art. 8(2). 
 280. Id.  
 281. Id.  
 282. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, ¶ 50. 
 283. Id. ¶ 50, 55. 
 284. Id. ¶ 50.  
 285. Id. ¶ 55, 56; see also U.N. Charter, art. 2.  
 286. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, ¶ 56; see also U.N. Charter, art. 2.  
 287. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, ¶ 56. 
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member nations of the United Nations, but that is precisely what was 
achieved by the adoption of the Charter.”288 By granting the ICTY and 
ICTR primacy of jurisdiction, the Security Council granted the tribunals 
the power to transfer to themselves the sovereign entitlements, or 
jurisdiction of states, to prosecute for acts falling within the tribunals’ 
subject matter, geographic and temporal jurisdiction. It is not by accident 
that these jurisdictional provisions immediately precede, and justify, the 
statutes’ double jeopardy provisions.289  
With respect to the latter, the statutes provide that “[n]o person shall be 
tried before a national court for acts constituting serious violations of 
international humanitarian law under the present Statute, for which he or 
she has already been tried by the International Tribunal.”290 Since the 
tribunals overtake the jurisdiction of states to prosecute for the acts in 
question, they leave national courts no residual jurisdiction upon which to 
prosecute. Thus while national courts have concurrent jurisdiction, their 
jurisdiction vanishes once the ad hoc tribunal prosecutes. And because 
national courts have no jurisdiction left upon which to prosecute, double 
jeopardy protection from national court prosecution obtains.  
The double jeopardy shield runs the other way too in the statutes, and 
protects individuals from successive tribunal prosecution where the 
individual already has been subject to prosecution by national courts.291 
There are, however, two exceptions. One is practical: the national 
proceedings must have been impartially, independently, and diligently 
prosecuted.292 The other is more significant for the jurisdictional theory: 
the individual “may be subsequently tried by the International Tribunal 
only if the act for which he or she was tried [in national court] was 
characterized as an ordinary crime.”293  
For example, if Jane kills some people based on their ethnic identity 
with the intent to destroy that ethnic group in whole or in part,294 and a 
national court prosecutes Jane for the international crime of genocide, the 
ad hoc tribunals may not then prosecute Jane a second time for genocide. 
This provision makes sense under the jurisdictional theory presented by 
 
 
 288. Id. ¶ 63 (quoting the trial court).  
 289. See ICTY Statute, supra note 276, arts. 9, 10; ICTR Statute, supra note 276, arts. 8, 9. 
 290. See ICTY Statute, supra note 276, art. 10(1); ICTR Statute, supra note 276, art. 9(1). 
 291. See ICTY Statute, supra note 276, art. 10(2); ICTR Statute, supra note 276, art. 9(2). 
 292. ICTY Statute, supra note 276, art. 10(2)(b); ICTR Statute, supra note 276, art. 9(2)(b). 
 293. See ICTY Statute, supra note 276, art. 10(2)(a) (emphasis added).  
 294. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 6, Dec. 9, 
1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; see also ICTY Statute, supra note 276, art. 4(2)(a)(2); ICTR 
Statute, supra note 276, art. 2(2)(a). 
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this Article. Since states are constituents of the international legal system, 
the national court that prosecutes Jane for genocide would have enforced 
both national and international law over the crime of genocide. The 
tribunal therefore would have no jurisdiction upon which to prosecute Jane 
a second time for that crime.  
On the other hand, if the national court prosecutes Jane not for the 
international crime of genocide, but for the “ordinary crime” of homicide, 
the international tribunal may still prosecute Jane for that same act under 
the international law proscribing genocide.295 This too would make sense 
under the jurisdictional theory. Because the prior national court 
proceedings did not apply and enforce international law, but prosecuted 
only for “ordinary crimes” under national law, the national court did not 
act as the decentralized “international sovereign.” That is, the national 
prosecution did not apply and enforce international law. The international 
tribunal, therefore, could continue to represent a distinct lawgiver (the 
international legal system) applying and enforcing a distinct law 
(international law) in respect of a distinct crime (an international crime) 
arising from acts for which an individual already was prosecuted in 
national court.  
2. ICC 
While transfers of jurisdiction to the ICTY and ICTR were essentially 
forced upon states through the Security Council’s Chapter VII measures 
creating those tribunals, transfers of jurisdiction by states to the ICC are 
for the most part more voluntary in nature. States parties created the ICC 
directly through international agreement, the final version of which is 
embodied in its statute.296 The ICC, in turn, draws its authority from that 
agreement.297 The Rome Statute defines the scope and sets the terms of 
states’ transfers of jurisdiction to the ICC, which winds up defining the 
scope and setting the terms of the exercise of the ICC’s jurisdiction.  
Under the statute the ICC may exercise jurisdiction in three ways. First, 
it may exercise jurisdiction where a state party on whose territory the 
 
 
 295. ICTY Statute, supra note 276, art. 4(2)(a)(2); ICTR Statute, supra note 276, art. 2(2)(a). 
Michele N. Morosin points out that the argument for a successive international tribunal prosecution 
under this type of provision “is strengthened if the country [in which the national court proceedings 
occur] has a statute addressing genocide and did not charge the defendant with this crime.” Morosin, 
supra note 13, at 265.  
 296. See ICC Statute, supra note 276, pmbl. (“The States Parties to this Statute . . . [h]ave agreed 
as follows . . . .”).  
 297. Id. art. 1. 
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crime occurred or whose national is alleged to have committed the crime 
refers prosecution to the ICC.298 The referral constitutes a fairly 
straightforward transfer of state party jurisdiction over territory and 
nationals to the ICC. Second, the prosecutor may initiate an investigation 
if the crime is alleged to have occurred in the territory of a state party or if 
the person accused of the crime is a national of a state party.299 Again, the 
ICC borrows the jurisdiction of a state party over its territory and nationals 
in order to prosecute. In both of these situations, ICC jurisdiction is 
limited to the national jurisdictions—based on entitlements over territory 
and persons—of its member states.300  
Third, the ICC is allowed to reach beyond the national jurisdictions of 
member states where crimes are “referred to the Prosecutor by the Security 
Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.”301 
Here we are back to the same transfer of jurisdiction effectuated by the 
Security Council that underpinned the creation of the ICTY and ICTR. 
Instead of the Security Council having to establish new ad hoc tribunals 
every time international peace and security so require, the ICC stands in as 
a Chapter VII organ when needed.  
In contrast to the ICTY and ICTR, however, the ICC’s power to 
exercise jurisdiction is subject to its own special jurisdictional dynamic. It 
enjoys only “complementary” jurisdiction to national courts.302 Under this 
dynamic, the ICC complements national courts by reinforcing “the 
primary obligation of States” to prosecute for conduct constituting serious 
international crimes.303 Only where states fail to fulfill this obligation does 
the ICC step in to “fill the gap.”304  
The preamble to the Rome Statute and Article 1 set forth the ICC’s 
complementary jurisdiction,305 and Article 17 lays out its central operation. 
With exceptions for sham,306 biased,307 or unjustifiably delayed 
 
 
 298. Id. arts. 13(a), 12(2)(a),(b); cf. Michael P. Scharf, The ICC’s Jurisdiction over the Nationals 
of Non-Party States: A Critique of the U.S. Position, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 110–17 (2001).  
 299. ICC Statute, supra note 276, arts. 13(c), 12(2)(a),(b). 
 300. The “applicable law” provisions of the Rome Statute further confirm that the ICC uses states’ 
national jurisdiction to prosecute, explicitly directing that the ICC may rely upon “the national laws of 
States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime.” ICC Statute, supra note 276, art. 
21(1)(c). 
 301. Id. art. 13(b). 
 302. Id. art. 1.  
 303. John T. Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity, in INTRODUCTION TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 41, 73–74 (Roy S. Lee ed., 
1999). 
 304. Id.  
 305. ICC Statute, supra note 276, pmbl., art 1.  
 306. Id. art. 17(2)(a). 
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prosecutions in national courts,308 the ICC may not exercise jurisdiction 
where a state with jurisdiction is investigating or prosecuting the crime,309 
has investigated the crime and decided not to prosecute,310 or has already 
tried the accused.311  
Thus, like the ICTY and ICTR statutes, the Rome Statute contains a 
jurisdictional dynamic between national courts and international tribunals 
establishing a shared jurisdiction between them. But unlike the ICTY and 
ICTR, the ICC’s complementary jurisdiction places jurisdictional primacy 
in the hands of states, not the tribunal. Where states exercise national 
jurisdiction, they extinguish the jurisdiction of the ICC. As the flip side of 
primacy of jurisdiction, the ICC’s complementary jurisdiction explains the 
Rome Statute’s double jeopardy provisions.  
Like the ad hoc tribunal statutes, the Rome Statute also protects 
individuals from successive prosecutions as between the ICC and national 
courts. But unlike the ICTY and ICTR, the ICC’s double jeopardy 
provisions grant broader power to states, not the tribunal. In fact, just as 
the ICTY and ICTR reserve a portion of international jurisdiction for the 
tribunals to exercise after a national court prosecution for an ordinary 
crime, the Rome Statute appears to reserve for states a portion of national 
jurisdiction to exercise after an ICC prosecution for an international crime. 
I shall explain in more detail.  
Article 20 of the Rome Statute provides: “No person who has been 
tried by another court for conduct also proscribed under article 6, 7, or 8 
[articles which lay out conduct constituting crimes within the ICC’s 
subject matter jurisdiction] shall be tried by the Court with respect to the 
same conduct”312 unless the other court’s proceedings were designed to 
shield the individual313 or were otherwise flawed so as not to achieve 
justice.314 Since the ICC has only complementary jurisdiction, once a state 
properly exercises national jurisdiction over the conduct in question, the 
ICC has no jurisdiction left upon which to prosecute. The result is double 
jeopardy protection from a successive ICC prosecution for that conduct.  
Reversing the double jeopardy shield to address the situation of a prior 
ICC prosecution and a successive national court prosecution, Article 20 
 
 
 307. Id. art. 17(2)(c). 
 308. Id. art. 17(2)(b).  
 309. Id. art. 17(1)(a). 
 310. Id. art. 17(1)(b). 
 311. Id. art. 17(1)(c).  
 312. Id. art. 20(3) (emphasis added).  
 313. Id. art. 20(3)(a) 
 314. Id. art. 20(3)(b). 
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provides: “No person shall be tried by another court for a crime referred to 
in article 5 [the article setting forth crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction] 
for which that person has already been convicted or acquitted by the 
Court.”315 Notice here use of the term “crime,” instead of “acts” or 
“conduct.” The use is deliberate on the face of the statute since, as quoted 
above, Article 20 frames the double jeopardy protection flowing from 
national courts to the ICC as a protection from prosecution for the “same 
conduct.”316 Moreover, the Article 20 protection prohibiting a successive 
prosecution in national courts for the same “crime” already adjudicated in 
the ICC references Article 5 of the Rome Statute, which sets forth the 
“Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.”317 By contrast, the Article 20 
protection prohibiting a successive ICC prosecution for “conduct” already 
adjudicated in national courts references Articles 6, 7, and 8—articles 
which lay out conduct that forms the basis of the crimes listed in Article 
5.318  
The scope of the double jeopardy protections in the Rome Statute is 
therefore the opposite of that contained in the ICTY and ICTR statutes. 
While the ICTY and ICTR have primacy over acts constituting serious 
violations of international law and can extinguish national court 
jurisdiction over those acts when they prosecute, national courts have 
primacy over conduct constituting the crimes enumerated in the Rome 
Statute and can extinguish ICC jurisdiction over that conduct when they 
prosecute.  
Further, just as the ICTY and ICTR might vindicate international law 
by prosecuting an individual for acts constituting international crimes, 
even though national courts already have prosecuted the same individual 
for those same acts as “ordinary” crimes under national law, the Rome 
Statute leaves open the possibility that a national court might vindicate 
national law by prosecuting an individual for conduct constituting an 
ordinary crime, even though the ICC already has prosecuted the same 
individual for that same conduct, but as an international crime. The 
national court just cannot successively prosecute for the same “crime” as 
the ICC, i.e., an international crime. Thus if Jane is prosecuted for the 
international crime of genocide by the ICC, a national court may not 
 
 
 315. Id. art. 20(2).  
 316. Id. art. 20(3) (emphasis added). Similarly, Article 20’s prohibition on successive prosecutions 
in the ICC states that “no person shall be tried before the Court with respect to conduct which formed 
the basis of crimes for which the person has been convicted or acquitted by the Court.” Id. art. 20(1) 
(emphasis added).  
 317. Id. arts. 20(2), 5. 
 318. Id. arts. 20(3), 6, 7, 8. 
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prosecute her again for genocide, but may prosecute her for the ordinary 
crime of homicide. And this all makes sense under the jurisdictional 
theory since the national court would be enforcing a different law—
national law—than that enforced by the ICC. 
This Part has shown how the complex of double jeopardy provisions 
contained in international tribunal statutes becomes explicable through 
concepts of jurisdiction. An exercise of jurisdiction by a tribunal usually 
extinguishes an exercise of that same jurisdiction by states, and vice versa. 
The result is double jeopardy protection. Where the statutes allow a 
successive prosecution, they do so by reserving a portion of either national 
or international jurisdiction to the state or tribunal, respectively. In sum, 
the provisions make perfect sense under a jurisdictional theory of double 
jeopardy.  
E. Universal Jurisdiction  
The analysis so far has shown international law to be largely consistent 
with a jurisdictional theory of double jeopardy in that states with national 
jurisdiction generally retain the power to prosecute in the face of prior 
prosecutions by other states. Rules (1) and (2) of the three double jeopardy 
rules set out in Part III explain this baseline rule. The analysis also has 
shown how the theory helps to explain the operation of double jeopardy 
rules in the special context of international tribunals where states and 
tribunals share jurisdiction. What remains is to explain international law 
and practice relating to exercises of universal jurisdiction under Rule (3), 
which holds that a state with only universal jurisdiction cannot prosecute 
again where a state with national jurisdiction already has prosecuted for 
the same crime.  
Since states have begun only recently to explore in earnest universal 
jurisdiction over activity occurring in the territories of other states,319 it is 
probably premature to conclude that state practice and opinio juris (that 
the practice results from a sense of legal obligation)320 already have 
combined definitively to establish that a prosecution by a state with 
national jurisdiction bars prosecutions by states with only universal 
jurisdiction. Yet the clear international trend appears overwhelmingly to 
favor this double jeopardy rule. The jurisdictional theory indicates why.  
 
 
 319. See REYDAMS, supra note 154, at 1. 
 320. See JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESSES 75 
(2002).  
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To take one high-profile example, Spain’s universal jurisdiction law 
contains an express double jeopardy bar to this effect. Codified at Article 
23.4 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, it limits the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction to situations where “the accused has not been 
absolved, pardoned, or sentenced in another country, or in the last case, 
that the sentence has not been completed.”321 Spanish courts have 
elaborated the jurisdictional rationale of this double jeopardy limitation. 
The Spanish Supreme Court observed in the Peruvian Genocide case 
involving universal jurisdiction claims over former Peruvian Prime 
Minister Alberto Fujimori that “the necessity of judicial intervention 
pursuant to the principle of universal jurisdiction remains excluded when 
[the] territorial jurisdiction is effectively prosecuting the crime of 
universal character in its own country.”322 In keeping with this Article’s 
theory, the Court explained that this principle of jurisdictional exclusion 
“is derived from the very nature . . . of universal jurisdiction.”323 Because 
Peru, the national jurisdiction state, had initiated its own prosecution 
against the accused, Spanish jurisdiction was “excluded” and the case 
dismissed.324 More recently, in the Guatemala Genocide Case, the 
Constitutional Court called upon Article 23.4’s double jeopardy limitation 
to respond to concerns about competition among jurisdictions resulting 
from universal jurisdiction.325 The Court explained that since a prosecution 
by a state with national jurisdiction precludes universal jurisdiction by 
Spain, no competition would result.326  
What is perhaps even more interesting is that Spain seems to have a 
relatively permissive law as compared to other countries with universal 
jurisdiction laws on the books. While explicitly referencing Article 23.4’s 
double jeopardy bar as a limitation on the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
in the Guatemala Genocide case, the Constitutional Court refused to apply 
a principle of subsidiary jurisdiction.327 Under the particular subsidiary 
principle at issue in the case, the party bringing the universal jurisdiction 
 
 
 321. Peruvian Genocide, STS, May 20, 2003 (J.T.S. No. 712), reprinted in 42 I.L.M. 1200, 1205 
(2003). Also, states with laws generally prohibiting successive prosecutions for extraterritorial acts 
where the accused already has been prosecuted abroad necessarily include a prohibition on successive 
universal jurisdiction prosecutions. See, e.g., Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] § 65(4) (Austria), 
translated in REYDAMS, supra note 154, at 94; see also Van den Wyngaert & Stessens, supra note 13, 
at 784.  
 322. Peruvian Genocide, 42 I.L.M. 1200, 1205. 
 323. Id.  
 324. Id. at 1206.  
 325. Guatemala Genocide, supra note 146. 
 326. Id.  
 327. Id.  
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action would have needed affirmatively to show inaction on the part of the 
state with national jurisdiction in order for Spanish courts to exercise 
jurisdiction.328 The Court felt that this was too high a burden to place on 
plaintiffs.329 Its discussion raises the far more common reason why any 
instances of successful successive prosecution based solely on universal 
jurisdiction are so hard to find.330  
The major reason why states appear not to prosecute successively on 
universal jurisdiction grounds is that these cases never appear to be 
brought in the first place, or never seem to reach any meaningful stage of 
procedure. States do not confront the double jeopardy issue in cases of 
universal jurisdiction because they tend broadly to defer to states with 
national jurisdiction, and only take up universal jurisdiction prosecutions 
where it can be shown—and the burden is usually on the parties trying to 
initiate suit to show it—that states with national jurisdiction are either 
unable or unwilling to prosecute, or that the prior prosecution was a sham 
designed to shield the accused. Thus a main situation in which states have 
been willing to exercise universal jurisdiction in the past has been where 
the national jurisdiction state simply does not have a functioning legal 
system.331  
In this sense universal jurisdiction appears to function as a kind of 
subsidiary or complementary jurisdiction to national jurisdiction, whereby 
states with national jurisdiction have “first dibs” and can, through a good 
faith prosecutorial effort, foreclose the possibility of a successive universal 
jurisdiction prosecution in a manner similar to a national court foreclosing 
a successive international tribunal prosecution.332 To be sure, some states’ 
universal jurisdiction laws specifically provide for only complementary 
jurisdiction precisely because the laws implement obligations under the 
ICC’s Rome Statute.333 Thus, as in the tribunal statutes, the double 
jeopardy question becomes consequentially linked to the question of 
jurisdictional priority. States do not exercise universal jurisdiction because 
 
 
 328. Id.; see also Naomi Roht-Arraiza, International Decision: Guatemala Genocide Case, 100 
AM. J. INT’L L. 207, 210 (2006).  
 329. Guatemala Genocide, supra note 146.  
 330. Research has uncovered no instance of a successive prosecution based only on universal 
jurisdiction.  
 331. See Anthony J. Colangelo, The New Universal Jurisdiction: In Absentia Signaling over 
Clearly Defined Crimes, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 537, 551–57 (2005) (discussing cases).  
 332. See supra Part IV.E.  
 333. See, e.g., Völkerstrafgesetzbuch [VStGB] [German Code of Crimes Against Int’l Law] June 
30, 2002, BGBl. I at 2254 (F.R.G.). An English translation is available at the homepage for the Max 
Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law, http://www.iuscrim.mpg.de/shared/data/ 
pdf/vstgbengl.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).  
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they give primacy to states with national jurisdiction, and the result is a 
shield from successive universal jurisdiction prosecution. The Republic of 
the Congo recently argued in a case pending before the International Court 
of Justice that this principle of subsidiary jurisdiction already has attained 
international legal force, and therefore foreclosed French universal 
jurisdiction proceedings against Congolese nationals because a Congolese 
prosecution for the same offenses against the same individuals already had 
commenced.334 After canvassing state practice in this regard, I explain that 
this rule of priority finds further support in international treaty law.  
1. Jurisdictional Priority in National Laws 
The determination by states with universal jurisdiction laws to give 
primacy to states with national jurisdiction occurs through a number of 
devices, including the law itself, judicial construction of the law, and 
prosecutorial discretion (which is often purposely incorporated into the 
universal jurisdiction law to guarantee such primacy).  
a. Legislative and Judicial Determinations 
Some states have built into their laws a jurisdictional hierarchy that 
grants primacy to states with national jurisdiction. For instance, the 
Austrian Supreme Court has interpreted Austrian Penal Code § 65(1)(2), 
which allows extraterritorial jurisdiction only if the accused cannot be 
extradited,335 to condition Austrian exercises of universal jurisdiction on 
an inability to extradite to the state with territorial jurisdiction because that 
state’s legal system is not functional.336 Similarly, Dutch law recognizes a 
hierarchy of jurisdiction which gives priority to states with territorial 
jurisdiction over the exercise of universal jurisdiction by Dutch courts.337 
In deciding whether to exercise universal jurisdiction, Austrian,338 
 
 
 334. Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Congo v. Fr.), 2003 I.C.J. 107 (June 16); 
Application Instituting Proceedings, On Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Congo v. Fr.), 2003 
I.C.J. Pleadings IV(A)(1), ¶ 2 (Apr. 11, 2003), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/129/ 
7067.pdf. The Court has not yet issued an opinion. Like Spain, France’s universal jurisdiction law 
prohibits universal jurisdiction proceedings against individuals who have been finally acquitted or 
convicted abroad. See French Code de procédure pénale [C. PR. PÉN.], art. 692 (Fr.).  
 335. Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] §§ 64(1)(6), 65(1)(2) (Austria).  
 336. ARIANA PEARLROTH, REDRESS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: 
COUNTRY STUDIES 3 (2003), http://www.redress.org/conferences/country%20studies.pdf (summarizing 
the Cvjetkovic Case).  
 337. Id. at 26.  
 338. REYDAMS, supra note 154, at 99. 
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Danish,339 German,340 and Belgian341 courts all appear to have first 
determined that states with national jurisdiction were either unwilling or 
unable to prosecute. As the Bavarian Supreme Court explained its exercise 
of universal jurisdiction over a Bosnian national for crimes committed in 
the former Yugoslavia, “since the . . . competent territorial State do[es] not 
wish to take over the proceedings, Germany has an interest not to be 
perceived by the international community as a haven for international 
criminals.”342  
b. Prosecutorial Discretion 
More recently, prosecutorial discretion has become a popular device to 
block universal jurisdiction exercises through jurisdictional primacy 
determinations before a case even gets to the courts. This discretion is 
often incorporated directly into the universal jurisdiction law, and is often 
an exceptional power unique to universal jurisdiction complaints. One of 
the major overhauls of the much-ballyhooed Belgian universal jurisdiction 
legislation was the addition of absolute prosecutorial discretion over 
universal jurisdiction claims.343 Previously, as is typical in civil law 
countries, private victims could initiate suit through constitution de partie 
civile before an investigating judge.344 The Belgian law was amended 
twice in 2003 to give the public prosecutor the sole and unreviewable 
discretion to move forward with a universal jurisdiction case,345 and to 
refuse to proceed if “this matter should be brought . . . before a tribunal in 
the place where the acts were committed, or before the tribunals of a State 
in which the offender is a national or where he may be found, and as long 
as this tribunal is competent, independent, impartial and fair.”346 It was 
precisely this type of prosecutorial discretion provision—again, 
incorporated right into the universal jurisdiction law itself—that prevented 
a recent case against former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
 
 
 339. Id. at 127–29.  
 340. Id. at 151–52. 
 341. Id. at 109–11, 114.  
 342. Id. at 151. 
 343. Steven R. Ratner, Belgium’s War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 888, 890 
(2003). 
 344. Christine Van den Wyngaert, Belgium, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS IN THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 1, 16–18 (Christine Van den Wyngaert et al. eds., 1993). 
 345. U.S. Reaction to Belgian Universal Jurisdiction Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 984, 986–87 (2003).  
 346. Loi modifiant la loi du 16 juin 1993 relative à la répression des violations graves du droit 
international humanitaire et l’article 144 ter du Code judiciaire, Apr. 23, 2003, M.B., May 7, 2003, 
translated in 42 I.L.M. 749 (2003); see also Ratner, supra note 343, at 891 n.12.  
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and others from going forward in German courts.347 The prosecutor 
explained the power to prosecute universal crimes was subject to “a 
certain hierarchy,” under which German universal jurisdiction was not 
available unless it could be shown that “the primarily competent 
jurisdictions,” namely, “the state of the scene of the crime and the state 
whose nationals the perpetrators and victims are” were either unwilling or 
unable to prosecute.348  
2. Jurisdictional Priority in Treaty Law  
The primary competence of national jurisdiction states over states with 
only universal jurisdiction finds further support in treaty law. Close 
examination of the jurisdictional provisions of a wide range of treaties 
covering international crimes reveals, or at least strongly indicates, a 
jurisdictional hierarchy according to which states with national jurisdiction 
have priority over states with only universal jurisdiction. Two sets of 
jurisdictional provisions tend toward this conclusion.  
The first set is made up of provisions setting forth states parties with 
jurisdiction over the crime that is the subject of the treaty. These 
provisions routinely contain a series of paragraphs directing states to 
establish jurisdiction.349 States with what we have been calling national 
jurisdiction—that is, states having some connection to the crime based on 
territoriality, nationality, or national defense—are grouped together in 
paragraphs above separate, lower paragraphs that contemplate jurisdiction 
by states with no such link.350  
 
 
 347. See Scott Lyons, German Criminal Complaint Against Donald Rumsfeld and Others, AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHT, Dec. 14, 2006, http://www.asil.org/insights/2006/12/insights061214.html. 
 348. Letter and Memorandum from the Gen. Prosecuting Attorney of the Fed. Court to Wolfgang 
Kaleck (Feb. 10, 2005), available at http://www.brusselstribunal.org/pdf/RumsfeldGermany.pdf.  
 349. See infra note 350.  
 350. See Torture Convention, supra note 157, art. 5(1); Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, art. 4(1), Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 [hereinafter 
Hijacking Convention]; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation, art. 5(1), Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 [hereinafter Montreal 
Convention]; International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, art. 5(1), Dec. 17, 1979, 
T.I.A.S. No. 11081, 1316 U.N.T.S 205; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation, art. 6(1),(2), Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Maritime 
Navigation Convention]; International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, art. 
6(1),(2), Dec. 15, 1997, S. TREATY DOC NO. 106-6, 2149 U.N.T.S. 284 [hereinafter Bombing 
Convention]; International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, art. 7(1), 
(2), Dec. 9, 1999, 39 I.L.M. 270 [hereinafter Financing Convention]; International Convention for the 
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, art. 9(1),(2), annexed to G.A. Res. 59/240, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/59/240 (Feb. 24, 2005), 44 I.L.M. 815 (2005) [hereinafter Nuclear Terrorism Convention]; 
United Nations Convention Against Corruption, art. 12(1),(2), G.A. Res. 58/4 (Oct. 31, 2003), 43 
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These lower paragraphs, which are becoming increasingly common in 
treaties covering international crimes,351 provide for the establishment of 
“jurisdiction over the[] crimes in cases where the alleged offender is 
present in [the state’s] territory and it does not extradite him . . . to any of 
the states [with national jurisdiction].”352 The lower paragraph, in short, 
provides for a treaty-based equivalent of universal jurisdiction among 
states parties based on the presence of the accused353 and for the exercise 
of this type of jurisdiction where the accused is not extradited to a state 
with national jurisdiction.  
Article 5 of the Torture Convention is emblematic. Paragraph 1 lists the 
states with national jurisdiction and paragraph 2 provides for the treaty-
based equivalent of universal jurisdiction among states parties based on 
the presence of the accused, which jurisdiction is to be exercised where the 
accused is not extradited to a state with national jurisdiction: 
 1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary 
to establish its jurisdiction over the offences referred to in article 4 
in the following cases:  
 (a) When the offences are committed in any territory under its 
jurisdiction or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State;  
 (b) When the alleged offender is a national of that State;  
 (c) When the victim is a national of that State if that State 
considers it appropriate.  
 2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be 
necessary to establish its jurisdiction over such offences in cases 
where the alleged offender is present in any territory under its 
 
 
I.L.M. 37 (2004) [hereinafter Corruption Convention]; International Convention Against the 
Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, art 9(1), G.A. Res. 44/34, art. 10, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/44/34 (Dec. 4, 1989) [hereinafter Mercenary Convention]; International Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, art 9(1), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/WG.22/ 
WP.1/REV.4 (Sept. 23, 2005) [hereinafter Enforced Disappearance Convention]. 
 351. Older treaties covering international crimes do not provide for jurisdiction by states with no 
territorial or national link to the crime. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, supra note 294, art. 6.  
 352. See Torture Convention, supra note 157, art. 5(2); Hijacking Convention, supra note 350, art. 
4(2); Montreal Convention, supra note 350, art. 5(2); Hostage Convention, supra note 350, art. 5(2); 
Maritime Navigation Convention, supra note 350, art. 6(4); Bombing Convention, supra note 350, art. 
6(4); Financing Convention, supra note 350, art. 7(4); Nuclear Terrorism Convention, supra note 350, 
art. 9(4); Corruption Convention, supra note 350, art. 3(5); Mercenary Convention, supra note 350, 
art. 9(2); Enforced Disappearance Convention, supra note 350, art. 9(2).  
 353. For elaboration of this point, see Colangelo, supra note 135, at 166–69.  
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jurisdiction and it does not extradite him . . . to any of the States 
mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article.354  
The paragraph 2 catch-all thus seems designed to supplement the 
national jurisdiction in the first paragraph by closing a jurisdictional 
loophole among states parties, ensuring that the accused has no safe haven 
within their combined territories. The simple placement of this treaty-
based equivalent of universal jurisdiction into separate, “secondary” 
paragraphs—ones that come after the list of states with “primary” national 
jurisdiction—is significant,355 and the absolute uniformity of this hierarchy 
across treaties covering international crimes suggests that states consider 
jurisdiction without territorial or national links to the crime to be a 
subordinate basis of jurisdiction to jurisdiction based on such links, which 
ordinarily takes priority.  
The second set of treaty provisions indicating that national jurisdiction 
states have priority over universal jurisdiction states are the prior notice 
provisions. These provisions require a state party with custody over the 
accused to “immediately notify” the states with national jurisdiction, and, 
if the circumstances warrant a preliminary inquiry into the case, to 
“promptly report its findings to the said [national jurisdiction] States and 
[to] indicate whether it intends to exercise jurisdiction.”356 The provisions 
consequently signal which states have strong jurisdictional interests, i.e., 
states with national jurisdiction, and offer the opportunity to those states to 
request extradition before another, universal jurisdiction state exercises 
jurisdiction. It should be noted also that dicta in a Joint Separate Opinion 
from a recent case in the International Court of Justice involving a claim 
of universal jurisdiction further supports the view that states with national 
jurisdiction take priority over states with only universal jurisdiction.357  
 
 
 354. Torture Convention, supra note 157, art. 5.  
 355. There are a few treaties that contain more than one paragraph listing states with national 
jurisdiction, see, e.g., Corruption Convention, supra note 350, art. 42. What is important for my 
argument is that the treaty-based equivalent of universal jurisdiction comes after these national 
jurisdiction provisions, and that it is included in a separate paragraph. See id. This is uniformly true in 
the treaties. See supra note 350.  
 356. Torture Convention, supra note 157, art. 6(4).  
 357. Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Cong. v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 121, 
¶ 59 (Feb. 14) (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal). Among other 
guidelines, the Judges prescribed that the state wishing to assert universal jurisdiction “must first offer 
to the national State of the prospective accused person the opportunity itself to act upon the charges 
concerned.” Id. Given my reliance on treaty law, I want to draw some attention to where I think the 
opinion errs. The opinion distinguishes between “a classical assertion of []universal jurisdiction” 
exercised where the accused is not present on the state’s territory, id. ¶ 21, and the types of treaty 
provisions I have referred to above which, according to the opinion, have “come to be referred to as 
‘universal jurisdiction,’ though this is really an obligatory territorial jurisdiction over persons albeit in 
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In all, state practice accompanied by what appears to be an emerging 
sense of opinio juris indicates that states consider a good faith 
prosecutorial effort by a national jurisdiction state to foreclose the 
possibility of a successive prosecution by states with universal 
jurisdiction. Again, the jurisdictional theory explains why. Moreover, 
there appears a strong trend among states with universal jurisdiction laws 
to give primacy to states with national jurisdiction. In this respect, 
universal jurisdiction operates as a subsidiary or complementary 
jurisdiction to national jurisdiction. The trend of prioritizing national 
jurisdiction over universal jurisdiction is further supported by 
jurisdictional provisions contained in multilateral treaties, was recently 
argued in a case pending before the ICJ, and was approved by dicta in a 
recent ICJ opinion. Such a trend is highly significant to international 
double jeopardy protections because if the state with national jurisdiction 
prosecutes first for the crime at issue, the state with universal jurisdiction 
cannot successively prosecute—at least under a jurisdictional theory of 
double jeopardy.  
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW  
So far I have argued that a jurisdictional theory of double jeopardy 
supplies a useful analytical vehicle for understanding the corpus of 
Supreme Court dual sovereignty jurisprudence and also brings coherence 
to what otherwise looks like an unintelligible grab bag of international 
rules and practice. In this respect, my arguments until now have been 
largely descriptive. While the theory’s explanatory force may be able to 
stand on its own as a helpful contribution, it also recommends important 
 
 
relation to acts committed elsewhere,” id. ¶ 41. The opinion’s distinction between “classical” and 
“treaty-based” universal jurisdiction may well hold for universal adjudicative, or in personam, 
jurisdiction: the presence of the accused within a state’s territory gives that state’s courts personal 
jurisdiction, under the treaty, irrespective of where the crime occurred. Yet the distinction becomes 
more difficult to sustain with respect to prescriptive jurisdiction, or the state’s initial power to apply its 
laws to the conduct in question. The crime did not occur on the state’s territory and thus, as the opinion 
concedes, it is not that the state is exercising territorial jurisdiction over the crime itself. Rather, the 
opinion seems to be suggesting that once the defendant is in the state’s territory, the state has 
jurisdiction to prescribe as to that defendant. But if the presence of the accused—at some later point—
is all that is giving the state prescriptive power, the exercise of that power inevitably raises serious ex 
post facto problems if the state did not already have that power to begin with at the time the crime was 
committed (when the state had no link to the defendant). It would betray bedrock criminal law notions 
of legality to say, for instance, “We had no power to apply our law prohibiting X to you at the time you 
committed X; but now that you’re in our territory we are empowered retroactively to apply our 
prohibition to you.” Only if X were already prohibited under a universal international legal 
prohibition—that the state subsequently enforces once it obtains personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant—can the prescriptive jurisdiction stand.  
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doctrinal developments for double jeopardy law and practice in both the 
U.S. and international systems.  
In this Part I explore some of the more significant implications of the 
theory in this regard. To frame the discussion I begin by flagging an 
inherent normative tension between state sovereignty and individual rights 
in double jeopardy rules among sovereigns. In light of this tension, I argue 
that a jurisdictional theory can enrich both U.S. constitutional and 
international legal evaluation of double jeopardy by importing more 
nuanced analysis into conventional doctrine to better accommodate the 
competing interests at stake—particularly, individual rights interests; and 
therefore, the theory promises a sounder doctrine of double jeopardy in 
both systems. Specifically, the theory can enrich U.S. doctrine by calling 
for a due process analysis of a successively prosecuting sovereign’s 
jurisdiction—an analysis that holds the potential to change outcomes in 
cases of either U.S. state or federal extraterritorial jurisdiction. The theory 
similarly can enrich international doctrine through a reasonableness 
analysis of a successively prosecuting sovereign’s jurisdiction—an 
analysis that reflects the doctrinal and normative correctness of the double 
jeopardy rules articulated in Part III.  
Lastly, I engage the situation where multiple sovereigns legitimately 
have jurisdiction to pursue multiple prosecutions even under the revised 
constitutional and international tests proposed below. I suggest that this 
does not mean that these sovereigns necessarily will exercise that power to 
vindicate their interests. In fact, comity mechanisms already built into both 
the U.S. and international systems aim to facilitate a single prosecution in 
a single forum so as to satisfy the interests of multiple sovereigns, thus 
increasing efficiency and reducing friction for the system while 
simultaneously advancing the individual’s interest not to be prosecuted 
multiple times for the same crime. 
A. Normative Stakes 
The central normative tension in double jeopardy rules among 
sovereigns is between the ability of sovereigns to protect their interests 
through the enforcement of their criminal laws and the rights of 
individuals to be free from multiple prosecutions for the same criminal 
activity. The former ability self-evidently motivates the U.S. dual 
sovereignty doctrine as well as current international rules allowing states 
with independent jurisdiction successively to prosecute for acts that harm 
important entitlements over national territory and persons.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss4/1
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009] DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND MULTIPLE SOVEREIGNS 837 
 
 
 
 
The “underlying idea” of double jeopardy protection from the 
individual rights perspective, on the other hand,  
is that the State with all its resources and power should not be 
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an 
alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense 
and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of 
anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even 
though innocent he may be found guilty.358  
Taking this language at face value one might observe that the dual 
sovereignty doctrine and corresponding rules of international law appear 
to avoid the injunction against successive prosecutions since it is not the 
same “State” repeatedly attempting to convict. Justice Black’s reply to this 
observation in his dissent in Bartkus (a decision upholding on dual 
sovereignty grounds multiple prosecutions for the same robbery by federal 
and state authorities) goes far toward erasing that comfort:  
Looked at from the standpoint of the individual who is being 
prosecuted, this [dual sovereignty] notion is too subtle for me to 
grasp. . . .[I]t hurts no less for two “Sovereigns” to inflict [double 
jeopardy] than for one. . . . In each case, inescapably, a man is 
forced to face danger twice for the same conduct.359  
The same reasoning would seem to apply in the international context.360 
From the defendant’s perspective it does not matter all that much whether 
he is prosecuted twice by Germany, or whether he is prosecuted first by 
Italy and then by Germany.361 In both cases the same individual is 
“inescapably . . . forced to face danger twice for the same conduct.”362  
The salient normative question for double jeopardy rules among 
sovereigns therefore is how best to accommodate the sovereign’s right to 
enforce its laws and the individual’s right not to be prosecuted multiple 
times for the same criminal act. Conventional doctrine appears to offer a 
rather blunt binary choice: either we ought to allow multiple sovereigns to 
enforce their laws leading possibly to as many prosecutions as sovereigns 
with jurisdiction, or we ought to prohibit sovereigns from prosecuting 
successively in order absolutely to safeguard defendants’ rights.  
 
 
 358. Greene v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187–88 (1957).  
 359. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 155 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).  
 360. Van den Wyngaert & Stessens, supra note 13, at 781.  
 361. Id.  
 362. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 155.  
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This choice certainly dominates prevailing double jeopardy doctrine as 
far as the U.S. Supreme Court is concerned (and we know which way the 
Court comes out).363 The Court openly views dual sovereignty as an 
either/or proposition: either the successively prosecuting entity is a 
separate sovereign, in which case the prosecution is permissible, or it is 
not, in which case the prosecution is barred under the Double Jeopardy 
Clause. Indeed, noting that a “balancing of interests approach . . . cannot 
be reconciled with the dual sovereignty principle,” the Court has flatly 
observed: “If the States are separate sovereigns, as they must be under the 
definition of sovereignty which the Court has consistently employed, the 
circumstances of the case are irrelevant.”364 The lines are perhaps less 
clearly drawn for the international system. The law in some areas appears 
to make this type of broad distinction: either the human right against 
double jeopardy attaches to multiple prosecutions by multiple states, or it 
doesn’t. Yet practice seems more hued with some states undertaking a 
species of interest analysis to determine whether successively to prosecute, 
especially in cases of extraterritorial jurisdiction.365 I will now show how 
the theory enriches both U.S. and international doctrine.  
B. Implications for U.S. Constitutional Doctrine: “Due Process” 
As Part II of this Article demonstrated, the “sovereign” ability under 
the U.S. dual sovereignty doctrine successively to prosecute originates in 
the ability independently to make and apply law to the defendant, or to 
exercise jurisdiction. Nearly one hundred years ago the Supreme Court 
emphasized that although dual sovereignty was “thoroughly established,” 
it “relate[s] only to cases where the act sought to be punished is one over 
which both sovereignties have jurisdiction.”366 But if that is right, and the 
genesis and history of the doctrine strongly indicate that it is, the Court’s 
current dual sovereignty jurisprudence routinely ignores a critical 
constitutional inquiry: whether the successively prosecuting sovereign’s 
exercise of jurisdiction satisfies due process.  
All U.S. law students will recognize that a state’s exercise of 
jurisdiction cannot be “arbitrary or fundamentally unfair” under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,367 and that neither can the 
 
 
 363. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 91–94 (1985).  
 364. Id. at 92.  
 365. See supra Parts IV.C.1.b, IV.E.  
 366. S. Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Ind., 236 U.S. 439, 445 (1915). 
 367. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 311 (1981).  
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federal government’s under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.368 U.S. law students also know that—in stark contrast to the 
Supreme Court’s present dual sovereignty analysis—such a due process 
evaluation is a highly nuanced, fact-sensitive inquiry. A state’s exercise of 
prescriptive jurisdiction must satisfy constitutional tests that consider, 
among other things, the degree of contacts between the forum, the parties 
and the occurrence,369 the interests of the forum,370 and the reasonable 
expectations of the parties,371 in order both to protect defendants and to 
ensure that states “do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by 
their status as coequal sovereigns.”372 Also relevant to the calculus are the 
efficient resolution of controversies, orderly administration of law, and 
shared substantive policies within a system of multiple sovereigns.373  
The Supreme Court’s present dual sovereignty analysis contains none 
of this. A due process inquiry into the successively prosecuting state’s 
jurisdiction therefore not only seems required for dual sovereignty 
purposes given the jurisprudential origins and history of that doctrine, but 
also healthily complicates what is, at present, an unreflective doctrine that 
utterly excludes one of the two main normative considerations implicated 
by double jeopardy rules among sovereigns: individual rights. Moreover, 
as a pure matter of constitutional interpretation, the move to incorporate 
due process into double jeopardy doctrine has a certain structural appeal; 
the Double Jeopardy Clause and the Due Process Clause protections 
against federal power appear in the same amendment,374 and the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporates the Fifth 
Amendment’s double jeopardy protection against the states.375  
Significantly, a due process inquiry into a successively prosecuting 
sovereign’s jurisdiction likely would not alter dual sovereignty outcomes 
for successive prosecutions between federal and state governments—the 
original justification for the doctrine. Rather its bite would be on 
 
 
 368. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1990).  
 369. See Hague, 449 U.S. at 318 & n.24; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 
(1985).  
 370. Id.  
 371. Id.  
 372. Hague, 449 U.S. at 334 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292–94 (1980)).  
 373. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294; Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 
U.S. 102, 113–15 (1987). I realize that citing these cases adds to the prescriptive jurisdiction analysis 
adjudicative and, particularly, personal jurisdiction considerations. However, as Justice Black has 
pointed out, “both inquiries are closely related and to a substantial degree depend upon similar 
considerations.” Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 224–25 (1977).  
 374. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
 375. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).  
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successive prosecutions between U.S. states or by the U.S. federal 
government when it exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction. I address each 
scenario in turn.  
1. Federal/State 
Certain features of U.S. federalism indicate that a due process analysis 
likely would not alter the dual sovereignty doctrine’s preservation of 
separate federal and state prosecutorial power. Federal and state 
governments have overlapping territorial jurisdiction with respect to 
certain criminal acts and the defendant who commits them. Thus the 
defendant has clear notice, and simultaneously enjoys the benefits and 
protections, of both sets of laws. It is also likely that the laws aim to 
achieve different substantive policies, making their enforcement non-
redundant.  
Recall the very first articulation of the dual sovereignty doctrine: 
“Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State. . . . He may 
be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns. and [sic] may be liable to 
punishment for an infraction of the laws of either.”376 The Court also 
expounded early on that every citizen “owes allegiance to the two 
departments, so to speak, and within their respective spheres must pay the 
penalties which each exacts for disobedience to its laws. In return, he can 
demand protection from each within its own jurisdiction.”377  
It would not be unfair, under this original reasoning, to apply two sets 
of laws to the individual defendant because he both benefits from their 
concurrent protections and knows—he has notice and a reasonable 
expectation—that he is subject to two sets of laws and in fact may be held 
to account for breaking each of them. Moreover, each sovereign has a 
distinct interest—one federal and the other local—in enforcing its own 
distinct law, each of which tends to confer its own distinct benefits. This 
early reasoning is at the heart of a due process gauge that evaluates a 
sovereign’s exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to the benefits conferred by 
that sovereign’s laws upon the defendant, notice, and the efficient 
administration of law.378 It thus squarely addresses both of the normative 
considerations mentioned above.  
 
 
 376. Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 20 (1852).  
 377. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551 (1875).  
 378. See supra notes 368–73.  
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2. State/State 
The situation is different in the inter-state context where jurisdiction 
arguably is exercised extraterritorially and the interests of the states in 
enforcing local law are substantially similar. Take the case of Heath v. 
Alabama.379 Heath had hired two men in Georgia to kidnap and kill his 
wife, which they did—in Georgia.380 He was prosecuted for homicide in 
Georgia and pleaded guilty in exchange for a life sentence to avoid the 
death penalty.381 Alabama then prosecuted him for the same homicide, 
convicting him and sentencing him to death.382  
Heath argued to the Supreme Court that virtually all of the activity 
relating to the crime took place in Georgia.383 Thus, he contended, “the 
facts of this case strongly suggest that Alabama overreached its 
constitutional authority in exercising jurisdiction over these events that 
occurred in another state.”384 This was especially so, Heath argued, since 
unlike a successive federal/state prosecution scenario, Alabama and 
Georgia had the same interest in prosecution—the enforcement of local 
law against homicide.385 The Court refused to consider his jurisdictional 
objections, however, because Heath had failed to raise them on appeal in 
Alabama state court.386 And, finding Georgia and Alabama to be separate 
“sovereigns” with a perfunctory nod to the “ultimate source of power” of 
each, the Court upheld the successive prosecution.387  
But under a jurisdictional theory the Court would have had to consider 
Heath’s objections to Alabama jurisdiction over him—for it was that very 
jurisdiction, the ability to apply Alabama law to him, that made Alabama a 
“sovereign” with the meaning of the dual sovereignty doctrine. Who 
knows how the Court ultimately would have come out on the issue (there 
was evidence that at least some steps leading up to the homicide occurred 
in Alabama);388 but a due process analysis would have supplied a richer, 
more rights-sensitive approach by evaluating, inter alia, whether Heath 
reasonably could have known he was subjecting himself to Alabama law, 
 
 
 379. 474 U.S. 82, 82 (1985).  
 380. Id.  
 381. Id. at 84.  
 382. Id.  
 383. Brief of Petitioner at 27, Heath, 474 U.S. 82 (No. 84-5555). 
 384. Id.  
 385. Id. at 48. 
 386. Heath, 474 U.S. at 87.  
 387. Id. at 87–90. 
 388. Brief of Petitioner at 27, Heath, 474 U.S. 82 (No. 84-5555). 
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and whether he had availed himself of that law389 and might be forced to 
defend himself in Alabama,390 the strength of Alabama’s interest in a 
successive prosecution given the prior Georgia conviction under a nearly 
identical law,391 and Alabama’s prosecution in relation to the efficient 
administration of the law in a federal system.392 Such a nuanced inquiry 
capable of bringing into the fold of its analysis both the sovereign’s and 
the individual’s interests would be far preferable to the current one-
dimensional approach employed by the Court—an approach that, again, 
completely excludes individual rights. 
A due process approach also reinforces what the Supreme Court 
already has suggested about the extraterritorial application of state 
criminal law. U.S. states have for the most part adopted statutes, based on 
the Model Penal Code,393 that enlarge their territorial jurisdiction to 
encompass conduct within the state that leads to394 or is intended to lead 
to395 a harmful result outside the state, as well as to conduct outside the 
state that leads to396 or is intended to lead to397 a harmful result inside the 
state.398 While the Court has stated that “[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, 
but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify 
a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if [the defendant] had been 
present at the effect,”399 it has also found troubling under the Fourteenth 
Amendment a state’s criminalization of a status inside its borders without 
an act in its borders.400 Rather than engaging in fictions about territoriality, 
a due process inquiry into a state’s jurisdiction supplies established 
analytical machinery for determining whether a given trans-border crime 
meets the constitutional threshold for the application of a state’s criminal 
law. Firing a gun from State A across the border into State B and killing 
someone there may present a fairly clear case of State B criminal 
 
 
 389. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985). 
 390. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292–94 (1980). 
 391. Id.  
 392. Id.  
 393. See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 16.4(c) (3d ed. 2007). 
 394. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03(1)(a) (1985). 
 395. Id. § 1.03(1)(b), (c).  
 396. Id. § 1.03(1)(a).  
 397. Id. § 1.03(1)(b), (c).  
 398. The constitutionality of this legislation has been held not to violate due process “[b]ecause 
such legislation adheres to the territorial principle.” LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 393, § 16.4(c). 
 399. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911). 
 400. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (“We hold that a state law which imprisons 
a person thus afflicted [by drug addiction] as a criminal, even though he has never touched any 
narcotic drug within the State or been guilty of any irregular behavior there, inflicts cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).  
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jurisdiction.401 But what about poisoning a person in State A, who then 
travels to State B and dies there—or perhaps boards a plane to State Q, 
three thousand miles away. Should the latter States have jurisdiction to 
prosecute? What if the defendant had reason to know the victim would 
travel to State Q? What if the defendant did not have reason to know the 
victim would travel to State Q? Would it make a difference if State A, the 
State with clearly stronger links to the act, prosecutes first? The advent of 
the internet and cybercrime only adds to the complexity and urgency of 
these questions. A due process analysis that measures the connection 
between the criminal activity and the forum, as well as the interests of the 
forum, the defendant, and the larger system of co-equal states provides a 
ready and sophisticated framework for answering such complex 
jurisdictional and, under the theory presented here, double jeopardy 
questions for the domestic inter-state system. And it does so in a way that 
explicitly considers individual rights.  
3. Federal Extraterritorial  
Just as a state may not exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction contrary to 
Fourteenth Amendment due process, the federal government may not 
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction contrary to Fifth Amendment due 
process. While the courts of appeals appear to use slightly varying tests to 
determine whether an extension of federal jurisdiction abroad violates due 
process, all courts to have considered the matter have found that the Fifth 
Amendment prohibits the exercise of such jurisdiction from being 
arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.402 Elsewhere I have argued that the 
proper test—and the test that most courts employ even if they may not 
always come out and say so—incorporates jurisdictional principles of 
international law.403 By incorporating international law, Fifth Amendment 
due process affords the federal government a more expansive 
jurisdictional reach in the international context than the Fourteenth 
Amendment affords the states in the domestic context. For instance, while 
a state must have some link to the activity it seeks to regulate under the 
Fourteenth Amendment,404 the Fifth Amendment’s incorporation of the 
 
 
 401. See Strassheim, 221 U.S. at 285. 
 402. Colangelo, supra note 135, at 158–88 (discussing cases).  
 403. Id.  
 404. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985). 
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international law of universal jurisdiction allows the federal government to 
apply its laws to conduct having no nexus to the United States.405  
Finally, although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed directly the 
issue of Fifth Amendment due process limits on federal extraterritoriality, 
it has said in the related context of extraterritorial adjudicative jurisdiction 
by states over foreign defendants that due process not only considers the 
defendant’s interests, but also “calls for [consideration of] the procedural 
and substantive polices of other nations whose interests are affected by the 
assertion of jurisdiction,” requiring “a careful inquiry into the 
reasonableness of jurisdiction in the particular case”406—a move that leads 
right into the international rule described next.  
C. Implications for International Legal Doctrine: “Reasonableness”  
Like its importation of due process analysis into U.S. double jeopardy 
jurisprudence, the jurisdictional theory enriches international doctrine by 
inviting a reasonableness analysis of a successively prosecuting nation-
state’s jurisdiction. The oft-quoted test set forth by the Restatement on 
Foreign Relations Law provides that “a state may not exercise jurisdiction 
to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connections 
with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is 
unreasonable.”407 Chief among the factors for determining reasonableness 
are: “the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the 
extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has a 
substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;”408 
“connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between 
the regulating state and the person . . . responsible for the activity to be 
regulated [the defendant], or between that state and those whom the 
[regulated activity] is designed to protect [the plaintiff/victim];”409 the 
“importance of regulat[ing]” that particular activity to regulating state;410 
the “justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the 
 
 
 405. Colangelo, supra note 135, at 170–76. 
 406. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987).  
 407. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(1) 
(1987); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 818–19 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).  
 408. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 403(2)(a).  
 409. Id. § 403(2)(b). 
 410. Id. § 403(2)(c). 
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regulation;”411 the interests of, and “likelihood of conflict” with, other 
states;412 and traditions of the international system.413  
These factors look very much like factors U.S. courts use to evaluate 
jurisdiction under a due process inquiry; and in fact we have seen that the 
Supreme Court “typically describe[s] [due process] in terms of 
‘reasonableness.’”414 The factors similarly move past a simplistic 
sovereignty/individual rights choice to a more contextual, nuanced 
evaluation of a successively prosecuting state’s jurisdiction. Here I show 
how a reasonableness analysis provides a realistic and desirable way for 
international law to evaluate double jeopardy rules among sovereigns in 
light of the framework articulated and substantiated in Parts III and IV.  
1. General Application  
Parts III and IV demonstrated that international law presently allows 
different sovereigns successively to prosecute for the same crime if they 
have independent bases of national jurisdiction over that crime.415 A 
competing normative view might hold that double jeopardy protection 
ought to apply across all states to guarantee the defendant’s individual 
right against successive prosecutions. Strict adherence to either one of 
these views tends to preclude the other. Jurisdictional analysis provides a 
middle route: consideration of not only whether a state has a basis of 
national jurisdiction to prosecute successively, but also whether the 
exercise of that jurisdiction is reasonable given the factors above, reveals 
more balanced and realistically acceptable rules of international double 
jeopardy.  
To address the strict individual rights view first, any hard-and-fast rule 
prohibiting double jeopardy among national jurisdictionally interested 
states is, at present, highly improbable. States have strong sovereign 
interests in retaining the power to prosecute individuals who inflict serious 
harm on national territory and persons and whose actions threaten the 
security of the state itself. It is highly unlikely that states would be willing 
absolutely to surrender that power just because another state already has 
prosecuted. And frankly, nor is it clear that they should. If Osama bin 
Laden is caught traveling through Europe and is prosecuted by Spanish 
 
 
 411. Id. § 403(2)(d). 
 412. Id. § 403(2)(h). 
 413. Id. § 403(2)(e). 
 414. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). 
 415. See id.  
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courts for the September 11, 2001, bombings in New York City, should 
the United States really then have no power to prosecute him? Even if he 
is prosecuted in Afghanistan, a state with territorial links to the crimes, it 
is far from obvious that the United States ought thereafter to be blocked 
from exercising its own sovereign power to enforce its own criminal laws 
for acts that murdered approximately three thousand U.S. citizens on U.S. 
soil. Nor does it seem appropriate for a Spanish or German or Dutch 
prosecution of a serious human rights violator like Augusto Pinochet to 
foreclose a prosecution for torture in Chile, the locus of both the crime and 
the victim community. Yet a strict rule against international double 
jeopardy would seem to compel such results.  
The better, and far more realistic, approach would be to use a 
reasonableness analysis that considers—like due process—the defendant’s 
connections with the forum and reasonable expectations, the forum’s 
interest in prosecution, and the impact on other jurisdictionally interested 
states as well as the system generally. Under this approach the United 
States should be able successively to prosecute bin Laden, and Chile 
should be (or should have been) able successively to prosecute Pinochet. 
At the same time, we can imagine situations where an exercise of 
jurisdiction to prosecute successively might seem unreasonable. Suppose a 
Turkish national is accused of sinking a Norwegian-flag cruise ship 
docked in Turkish waters. Down with the ship goes the Norwegian crew as 
well as one hundred passengers of different nationalities, including one 
Brazilian, one Japanese and one U.S. citizen. Even if Turkey prosecutes 
for the crime it might still seem reasonable for Norway to exercise 
jurisdiction for successive prosecution purposes. The ship was “a floating 
piece of Norway,” creating a variation of territorial linkage in addition to 
the national links Norway would have to the drowned crew members. But 
what about Brazil, or Japan, or the United States? These countries may 
well have national jurisdiction based on passive personality.416 But their 
connections to the crime are surely more attenuated than those of Norway. 
Now, it may be perfectly reasonable for any of these three states to 
prosecute if the defendant has not already been prosecuted by another 
state. Even if only one of their nationals is killed that could create a strong 
enough interest to see justice done to make prosecution reasonable under 
international law. Where things might veer into the unreasonable, 
however, is if the individual already has been prosecuted, and by those 
states with the strongest links to the crime and in the best position to 
 
 
 416. See supra note 129.  
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evaluate the case, including evidence and witness testimony. Indeed, 
suppose Turkey and Norway both hold full and fair trials and each acquits 
the accused finding the whole thing to be a case of mistaken identity. A 
successive prosecution of this same individual by the United States 
certainly would seem unreasonable to the defendant, perhaps other 
interested states (most notably, Turkey and Norway), and the international 
system at large because of the conflicting judgments and potential frictions 
it might generate.  
2. Universal Jurisdiction Application 
Of course the international basis of jurisdiction with the least links to 
the crime, and that therefore threatens to be the least reasonable, is 
universal jurisdiction. But we already know that states with universal 
jurisdiction laws actually engage in a type of reasonableness analysis by 
giving primacy to national jurisdiction states and by refusing to prosecute 
successively where the latter already have prosecuted in line with Rule 
(3).417 The doctrinal soundness of this rule should now be plain.  
If we can all agree that multiple prosecutions for the same crime 
generally should be disfavored absent a competing reason, I will submit 
without much more that where a state with national jurisdiction prosecutes 
for an international crime, a state with only universal jurisdiction—that is, 
a state with no connection at all to the crime—ought not to be able to 
prosecute the same individual again for the same crime. Universal 
jurisdiction’s normative justification is protecting the interests of the 
international legal system and of victims of grave international crimes 
through decentralized enforcement of international law.418 Where a state 
with national jurisdiction already has prosecuted, the universal jurisdiction 
state has no distinct national interest in prosecuting again, and the interests 
of the international legal system (which underpin its universal jurisdiction 
to begin with) already have been vindicated. A good faith prosecution by a 
national jurisdiction state also vindicates the victims’ interests to see 
justice done. Indeed, a state with national or territorial links to universal 
crimes likely is going to be in a better position to vindicate victims’ rights 
than a state with no links to the crimes since it is more likely that the 
former also has stronger links to the victims.419 Hence the reason for 
 
 
 417. See supra Part IV.E.1.  
 418. See supra Part III.B and sources cited therein.  
 419. This is not to say that the universal jurisdiction state will have no link to the victims. Indeed, 
it may have been the victims who initiated the proceedings or brought their claims to the state’s 
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giving priority to national jurisdiction states over universal jurisdiction 
states.  
We might work in an exception where the first prosecution is a sham 
designed to insulate the accused, and as we saw, states already have 
incorporated such an exception through principles of complementarity.420 
The burden of proving a sham is generally high under these principles, and 
will mostly fall to the party seeking the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction.421 There is, naturally, always the chance that some court or 
prosecutor will dub a good faith foreign trial a sham in order to make a 
political point through a successive universal jurisdiction prosecution. But 
for better or worse, universal jurisdiction is probably here to stay. The 
challenge is to figure out how best to regulate its exercise. The very 
existence of the limits identified by this Article’s theory should assuage 
those skeptical of universal jurisdiction. For the alternative would be that 
any state that decides to pass a universal jurisdiction law might feel itself 
free to prosecute anyone, anytime.  
As it stands, the clear international legal trend is that a prosecution by a 
state with national jurisdiction precludes a successive prosecution by a 
state with only universal jurisdiction. In my view, this trend is 
theoretically compelled. Added onto this first trend is another trend, 
whereby states contemplating an exercise of universal jurisdiction give 
primacy to states with national jurisdiction. The combination of these two 
trends is the preclusion of universal jurisdiction prosecutions so long as 
territorial or national states are able and willing to prosecute in good faith.  
D. Further Reducing Successive Prosecutions: Enforcement Comity  
One big question remains: is there anything else in the U.S. and 
international systems that might suppress multiple prosecutions by 
different sovereigns whose exercise of jurisdiction is permissible—even 
under our revised tests? Indeed, just because successive prosecutions by 
different sovereigns are permitted does not mean that they are required. 
Both U.S. constitutional and international law set baselines. In the double 
jeopardy context both sets of laws as I have described them merely 
provide that different sovereigns may prosecute successively for the same 
 
 
attention for prosecution. See, e.g., Henry J. Steiner, Three Cheers for Universal Jurisdiction—Or Is It 
Only Two?, 5 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 199, 214 (2004) (describing Rwandan victims bringing 
proceedings in Belgium against Rwandans for crimes committed in Rwanda).  
 420. See supra notes 335–48.  
 421. See supra note 345.  
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crime where they have independent jurisdiction, not that they must—or 
that successive prosecutions are even a good idea. The law simply reserves 
for sovereigns the power of successive prosecution should they choose to 
exercise it. There may be very good political or policy reasons why they 
might choose not to. And in fact, consideration of some of these reasons 
has been systemically built into both U.S. and international law through 
doctrines of comity.  
Like other habitual terms unavoidably implicated by this Article’s 
argument,422 “comity” carries with it a mess of definitional baggage.423 
Whatever else it may stand for, the common idea behind modern comity 
doctrines seems to be that sovereigns should, and perhaps even have an 
obligation to, consider the interests of other sovereigns when deciding 
whether to exercise their own sovereign power; but that they are not 
bound, in a legal sense, to defer to those foreign interests.424 This is the 
broad sense in which I want to use the term here.  
We can think of comity as layering onto the “hard” legal baseline rules 
of double jeopardy softer policy considerations of how other 
jurisdictionally interested states (perhaps most particularly, states that 
already have prosecuted) might view a successive prosecution; and thus, 
as helping states contemplating successive prosecutions to internalize the 
impact of their exercise of sovereign power before pursuing such 
prosecutions. At the same time, because states are not bound to defer to 
the foreign interests they consider, comity offers flexibility for politically 
acceptable results.  
Like the three types of jurisdiction outlined in Part I of this Article—
prescriptive, adjudicative, and enforcement—comity can be classified into 
three types for the present double jeopardy discussion—prescriptive, 
adjudicative, and enforcement.425 Prescriptive comity implies a voluntary 
legislative limitation upon the reach of a state’s own laws out of deference 
to foreign interests. Adjudicative comity is the decision by a state’s courts 
not to apply the state’s laws out of deference to foreign interests. And 
enforcement comity is the decision of the state’s law-enforcer not to act 
 
 
 422. See, e.g., supra Parts II, III.A (discussing the problem of defining “sovereignty”). 
 423. For a synopsis of the meanings courts and commentators have given to the term, see Joel R. 
Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 5 (1991). For a critique of U.S. courts 
invoking comity without defining it, see Michael D. Ramsey, Escaping “International Comity,” 83 
IOWA L. REV. 893 (1998).  
 424. An oft-quoted formulation of the doctrine comes from the Supreme Court. Hilton v. Guyot, 
159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895) (“‘Comity’ . . . is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one 
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other.”).  
 425. Cf. id. at 164. 
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out of deference to foreign interests. Of these, enforcement comity in 
particular holds strong potential for accommodating the two competing 
normative considerations highlighted above. After explaining why this is, I 
will illustrate with real-world examples from the U.S. and international 
systems.  
A key advantage of enforcement comity is that it can facilitate strong 
and elastic “networks”426 among different sovereigns through their 
national enforcement agencies. Through these networks, agencies can 
represent their state’s interests from the beginning of an investigatory or 
prosecutorial effort by other states, thus lessening the need for, and 
probability of, successive prosecutions.  
Both adjudicative and prescriptive comity envisage domestic 
governmental actors, whether courts or legislatures, acting in relative 
isolation from foreign states when making their determinations about 
whether to pursue successive prosecutions. In the adjudicative comity 
scenario, the prosecution already has been brought, and the judge makes 
the unilateral determination whether the prosecution comports with 
whatever that judge’s notions of comity might be. In the legislative comity 
scenario, the legislature prescribes generally applicable rules governing all 
cases going forward. Perhaps the legislature could communicate with 
representatives of foreign states and take into account foreign interests in 
this general ex ante lawmaking process, but it has no ordinary institutional 
ability to change the rules based on contemporaneous communications 
with other states for each successive prosecution case that happens to 
arise.  
By contrast, a state’s enforcement agencies can communicate and 
cooperate contemporaneously with other states from the outset of a 
prosecutorial effort and leave open the communication and cooperation 
channels throughout the prosecution. The more communication and 
cooperation between enforcement agencies from the start, the higher the 
likelihood that a single prosecution will vindicate the interests of those 
agencies and the governments they represent, consequently lowering the 
likelihood of successive prosecutions. This not only creates efficiencies 
and eases friction for systems of multiple sovereigns, it also advances the 
individual’s interest not to be prosecuted multiple times.  
A few examples illustrate how enforcement comity can, and does, work 
in the both the U.S. and international systems: the U.S. Department of 
 
 
 426. See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); Jenia Iontcheva 
Turner, Transnational Networks and International Criminal Justice, 105 MICH. L. REV. 985 (2007).  
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Justice’s Petite policy; the U.S.-E.C. Positive Comity Agreement; and 
prior notice and consultation provisions in multilateral treaties covering 
international crimes. 
1. Enforcement Comity in the U.S. System: The Petite Policy  
The U.S. Justice Department’s Petite policy427 builds an institutional 
policy barrier against successive federal prosecution where the defendant 
already has been tried in state court for the same criminal activity.428 The 
federal prosecution must meet both substantive and procedural 
prerequisites.  
Substantively, “the matter must involve a substantial federal interest” 
and “the prior prosecution must have left that . . . interest demonstrably 
unvindicated.”429 Determination of whether the matter involves a 
substantial federal interest is “made on a case-by-case basis”; and 
determination of whether the federal interest is left unvindicated is subject 
to a presumption that the prior state prosecution—regardless of outcome—
adequately vindicated the federal interest.430 This presumption may be 
defeated by exceptions for sham or incompetent trials or inadequate 
sentences.431 It also may be overcome where “the alleged violation 
involves a compelling federal interest, particularly one implicating an 
enduring national priority” and “the alleged violation involves egregious 
conduct . . . or the impairment of the functioning of an agency of the 
federal government or the due administration of justice.”432  
The Petite policy is, in sum, an advanced and formalized version of 
enforcement comity as I have defined it above, here between the U.S. 
federal and state governments. It represents an institutionalized policy 
governing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion that requires deference 
to a prior state prosecution “even where a prior state prosecution would 
not legally bar a subsequent federal prosecution under the Double 
Jeopardy Clause because of the doctrine of dual sovereignty.”433 Yet the 
 
 
 427. The policy was named after Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960).  
 428. “The policy applies whenever there has been a prior state or federal prosecution resulting in 
an acquittal, a conviction, including one resulting from a plea agreement, or a dismissal or other 
termination of the case on the merits after jeopardy has attached.” DEPT. OF JUSTICE, U.S. 
ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-2.031(C) (Dual and Successive Prosecution Policy (“Petite Policy”)) 
[hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL]. 
 429. Id. § 9-2.031(D). 
 430. Id.  
 431. Id.  
 432. Id.  
 433. Id. § 9-2.031(B). 
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federal government retains its “sovereign” ability to overcome the 
presumption where the prior state prosecution did not adequately vindicate 
federal interests, either because the proceedings were faulty or their 
outcome was unsatisfying or the federal interest in prosecution is just so 
strong.434 As the Second Circuit has explained, the Petite policy “is not a 
limitation on the government’s sovereign right to vindicate its interests 
and values, and nothing prevents a federal prosecution whenever the state 
prosecution has not adequately protected the federal interest.”435  
Additionally, as a procedural matter, “the [successive federal] 
prosecution must be approved by the appropriate Assistant Attorney 
General.”436 This procedural requirement ensures accountability and “that 
the power to bring dual prosecutions is exercised selectively and that the 
substantive standards are carefully and consistently applied.”437 Moreover, 
in line with the argument set forth above:  
whenever a matter involves overlapping federal and state 
jurisdiction, federal prosecutors should, as soon as possible, consult 
with their state counterparts to determine the most appropriate 
single forum in which to proceed to satisfy the substantial federal 
and state interests involved, and, if possible, to resolve all criminal 
liability for the acts in question.438  
The overall purposes of the Petite policy therefore are to 
institutionalize deference to prior prosecutions for the same activity by 
other sovereigns but to retain the power to vindicate overriding federal 
interests while protecting defendants from having to endure multiple 
prosecutions unless those interests are compelling.439 A final purpose that 
helps achieve all of these other purposes is “to promote coordination and 
cooperation between federal and state prosecutors.”440 According to Harry 
 
 
 434. Id. § 9-2.031(D). 
 435. United States v. Davis, 906 F.2d 829, 832 (2d Cir. 1990).  
 436. U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 428, § 9-2.031(A). 
 437. Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg, Dual Prosecutions: A Model for Concurrent Federal 
Jurisdiction, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 72, 76 (1996).  
 438. U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 428, § 9-2.031(A).  
 439. Id.  
 440. Id. This is not to say that increased federal coordination and communication with state 
government does not potentially give rise to other problems. See Michael M. O’Hear, National 
Uniformity/Local Uniformity: Reconsidering the Use of Departures To Reduce Federal-State 
Sentencing Disparities, 87 IOWA L. REV. 721, 760 (2002) (describing how federal commandeering of 
state police through cooperative measures “obscures the boundaries of political responsibility and 
accountability, undermines the confidence constituents have in their officials, and erodes the authority 
of local and state institutions.”). For example, cooperating prosecuting entities may use a first 
prosecution as a dry run for a second, or may use the threat of prosecution by multiple sovereigns to 
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Litman and Mark Greenberg, the Petite policy has limited successive 
federal prosecutions to only “a minuscule fraction of the total number of 
state prosecutions in which federal jurisdiction is available.”441 And the 
American Bar Association found that because of the policy, “federal 
reprosecutions for the same conduct are rare and are usually undertaken to 
vindicate interests most citizens would find compelling.”442  
2. Enforcement Comity in the International System 
Enforcement comity in the international system can function much the 
same way it does in the U.S. system. It offers a means through which 
deference to foreign interests, communication, and cooperation may 
accommodate the interests of different sovereigns while preserving 
sovereignty and, as a practical matter, protect individuals from multiple 
prosecutions. Although the substantive and procedural mechanisms of 
enforcement comity in international relations might not be as advanced 
and formalized as the Petite policy, the building blocks are there and the 
seeds for future maturation have been sown.  
a. U.S.-E.C. Positive Comity Agreement 
In some areas of international regulation the movement toward more 
formal avenues of enforcement comity has already begun to take hold 
through agreements with fairly specific communication and coordination 
rules. To take a well-known example, the so-called “Positive Comity” 
Agreement between the European Communities and the United States 
addresses situations of potential concurrent jurisdiction over 
anticompetitive activities taking place in the territory of one party but 
adversely affecting interests of the other party.443 Under the Agreement, 
competition authorities of one party may request the competition 
authorities of the other party to take enforcement action against 
 
 
extract a more favorable plea bargain. Thus cooperation, especially unregulated cooperation, is not a 
panacea. My point is only that for the purpose of reducing double jeopardy, ex ante cooperation can 
help to ensure that a single prosecution fully vindicates the interests of all sovereigns, thereby 
obviating the need for multiple prosecutions.  
 441. Litman & Greenberg, supra note 437, at 77–78.  
 442. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, FINAL REPORT OF AD HOC 
TASK FORCE ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY (1994), reprinted in ADAM HARRIS KURLAND, SUCCESSIVE 
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 378 (2001).  
 443. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the European 
Communities on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of Their 
Competition Laws, U.S.-E.C., June 4, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1070, 1070–75. 
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anticompetitive activities taking place in the latter’s territory but affecting 
the interests of the former.444 A primary purpose of the agreement is to 
“[e]stablish cooperative procedures to achieve the most effective and 
efficient enforcement of competition law.”445  
Like the Petite policy, the Agreement creates a presumption that under 
certain circumstances “[t]he competition authorities of a Requesting Party 
will normally defer or suspend their own enforcement activities in favor of 
enforcement activities by the competition authorities of the Requested 
Party.”446 The presumption in favor of a single enforcement action is 
triggered by the fulfillment of certain criteria.  
First, the anticompetitive activities either do not have “direct, 
substantial and reasonably foreseeable impact on consumers in the 
Requesting Party’s territory”447 or “the anticompetitive activities do have 
such an impact on the Requesting Party’s consumers, [but] they occur 
principally in and are directed principally towards the other Party’s 
territory.”448 In other words, a party’s deferral or suspension of 
enforcement action is presumed where the other party has clearly stronger 
jurisdictional links to the activities in question. Next, “the adverse effects 
on the interests of the Requesting Party can be and are likely to be fully 
and adequately investigated and, as appropriate, eliminated or adequately 
remedied pursuant to the laws, procedures, and available remedies of the 
Requested Party.”449  
Last are communication and cooperation provisions requiring that the 
competition authorities of the Requested Party agree that in conducting 
their enforcement activities they will: devote adequate resources to the 
enforcement activities;450 use best efforts to pursue all sources of 
information, including those suggested by the Requesting Party;451 inform, 
and provide information to, the authorities of the Requesting Party on the 
status of the enforcement activities;452 “notify the . . . authorities of the 
Requesting Party of any change in their intentions with respect to 
investigation or enforcement”;453 and use best efforts to quickly pursue 
 
 
 444. Id. art. III.  
 445. Id. art. I.  
 446. Id. art. IV(2).  
 447. Id. art. IV(2)(a)(i). 
 448. Id. art. IV(2)(a)(ii).  
 449. Id. art. IV(2)(b).  
 450. Id. art. IV(2)(c)(i).  
 451. Id. art. IV(2)(c)(ii).  
 452. Id. art. IV(2)(c)(iii).  
 453. Id. art. IV(2)(c)(iv).  
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completion of an investigation and to obtain remedies.454 The requested 
party’s authorities also must “fully inform” the requesting party’s 
authorities “of the results of their investigation and take into account the 
views” of the requesting party’s authorities “prior to . . . settlement, 
initiation of proceedings, adoption of remedies, or termination of the 
investigation”455 as well as “comply with any reasonable request that may 
be made” by the Requesting Party’s authorities.456 These communication 
provisions clearly intend to see to it that the Requesting Party’s interests 
are satisfied by the Requested Party’s enforcement action, thus disposing 
of the need for multiple enforcement actions.  
The Agreement also provides that “[t]he competition authorities of the 
Requesting Party may defer or suspend their own enforcement activities if 
fewer than all of the conditions set out” above are satisfied,457 but that 
“[n]othing in this Agreement precludes the competition authorities of a 
Requesting Party that choose to defer or suspend independent enforcement 
activities from later initiating or reinstating such activities.”458 The 
Requesting Party therefore may always decide to defer to the other party’s 
enforcement action—and there is a presumption that it will when the listed 
criteria are present; but it still retains the sovereign power to pursue its 
own action should it feel that its interests remain unsatisfied.  
b. Prior Notice and Consultation Provisions 
The Petite policy and the U.S.-E.C. Positive Comity Agreement are 
examples of relatively mature enforcement comity regimes with well-
developed, formalized rules of communication and cooperation. Less well-
developed are prior notice and coordination provisions, referenced 
earlier,459 contained in multilateral treaties covering transnational and 
international crimes. Yet these provisions contemplate precisely the same 
sort of communication and cooperation opportunities among interested 
states as the Petite policy and Positive Comity Agreement.  
To take one notorious area of characteristically multi-jurisdictional 
crime, the major anti-terrorism treaties of the past forty years uniformly 
mandate prior notice to other jurisdictionally interested states.460 The 
 
 
 454. Id. art. IV(2)(c)(v).  
 455. Id. art. IV(2)(c)(vi).  
 456. Id. art. IV(2)(c)(vii).  
 457. Id. art. IV(3).  
 458. Id. art. IV(4).  
 459. See supra note 356.  
 460. See Hijacking Convention, supra note 350, art. 6(4); Montreal Convention, supra note 350, 
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treaties all contain similar, if not identical, provisions directing that any 
state making a “preliminary inquiry” or “investigation” into the facts of an 
offense set forth in the treaty “shall promptly report its findings to [other 
directly jurisdictionally interested states as designated by the treaty, i.e., 
national jurisdiction states] and shall indicate whether it intends to 
exercise jurisdiction.”461 
Coordination provisions additionally promote cooperation and ex ante 
resolution of jurisdictional disputes. For example, along with its prior 
notice provision, the Convention for the Suppression of Financing 
Terrorism provides that “[w]hen more than one State Party claims 
jurisdiction over the offences set forth [herein], the relevant States Parties 
shall strive to coordinate their actions appropriately, in particular 
concerning the conditions for prosecution and the modalities for mutual 
legal assistance.”462 The Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime similarly directs “that [where] one or more other States Parties are 
conducting an investigation, prosecution or judicial proceeding in respect 
of the same conduct, the competent authorities of those States Parties 
shall, as appropriate, consult one another with a view to coordinating their 
actions.”463 This same provision applies to the Convention’s three 
Protocols regarding human and weapons trafficking.464 And the Corruption 
Convention contains an identical provision.465 One result of these 
communication and coordination obligations hopefully would be 
agreement among interested states on a single forum for prosecution, and 
the representation and vindication of those states’ interests in that single 
forum’s prosecution.  
Indeed, an even stronger prior consultation (compared to prior notice) 
obligation explicitly geared toward arriving at a single forum for 
prosecution has started to appear in conventions dealing with almost 
 
 
art. 6(4); Hostage Convention, supra note 350, art. 6(6); Maritime Navigation Convention, supra note 
350, art. 7(5); Bombing Convention, supra note 350, art. 7(6); Financing Convention, supra note 350, 
art. 9(6); Nuclear Terrorism Convention, supra note 350, art. 10(6). 
 461. See supra note 460.  
 462. Financing Convention, supra note 350, art. 7(5).  
 463. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, art. 15(5), G.A. Res. 
55/25, Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Nov. 15, 2000).  
 464. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking of Persons, Especially Women and 
Children, art. 1(2), G.A. Res. 25, Annex II, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/55/49 
(Dec. 25, 2003); Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the 
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Crime, art. 1(2), G.A. Res. 55/25, Annex III, U.N. 
GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Jan. 8, 2001); Protocol Against the Illicit 
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, art. 1(2), 
G.A. Res. 55/255, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/255 (July 3, 2005).  
 465. United Nations Convention against Corruption, supra note 350, art. 42(5).  
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definitionally multi-jurisdictional activity. For example, Article 22 of the 
Convention on Cybercrime states: “When more than one Party claims 
jurisdiction over an alleged offence established in accordance with this 
Convention, the Parties involved shall, where appropriate, consult with a 
view to determining the most appropriate jurisdiction for prosecution.”466 
Article 4 of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions contains an identical 
provision.467  
Enforcement comity currently represents both a feasible and helpful 
mechanism through which jurisdictionally interested states can reduce 
successive prosecutions for multi-jurisdictional crimes. It preserves states’ 
sovereign flexibility to prosecute for acts seriously harming national 
interests while easing friction and enhancing efficiency by inviting states 
to internalize ex ante the effects of successive prosecutions on other states 
and encouraging communication and cooperation from the outset of 
investigatory and prosecutorial efforts. The result, beneficial to both 
sovereigns and defendants, is a single enforcement action in a single 
forum in which all relevant states’ interests are represented.  
CONCLUSION 
Double jeopardy rules among sovereigns throw into sharp relief 
fundamental tensions between some of our most basic legal intuitions 
concerning individual rights and the very idea of sovereignty. And they do 
so against a backdrop loaded with questions about the proper distribution 
of power in two of the world’s major legal systems. Resolution of these 
tensions in a coherent and practical fashion poses a central challenge for 
both U.S. and international law.  
This Article has attempted to meet that challenge head on. It offers a 
theory that not only explains an otherwise opaque domestic doctrine and 
seemingly incoherent mix of international rules and practice, but also 
recommends adjustments to each body of law that better accommodate the 
competing interests at stake—including those of multiple sovereigns, the 
systems they comprise, and those of individual defendants.  
 
 
 466. Convention on Cybercrime, art. 22(5), Nov. 23, 2001, C.E.T.S. No. 185. 
 467. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions, art. 4(3), Dec. 17, 1997, OECD Doc. DAFFE/IME/BR(97)20, 37 I.L.M. 1.  
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